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I didn't research it. But I shouldn't have to research it. I
believed these guys, everything they were telling me.1
The above statement of Paul Gelsinger, who withdrew his teenage son Jesse from life support after an infu-
sion of gene-altered viruses meant to correct an enzyme deciency triggered an immune reaction that went
awry, expresses a parent's distress at being inadequately advised about a University of Pennsylvania gene
therapy experiment in which he encouraged his child to participate. Neither father nor son recognized that
the experiment bestowed no benet upon the teenager and had been fashioned to evaluate the safety of a
1Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Teenager's Death is Shaking Up Field of Human Gene Therapy Experiments, N.Y. TIMES, January
27, 2000, at A20.
1treatment for babies with a fatal form of Jesse's disorder. Mr. Gelsinger, who now regards his decision
to trust Penn researchers as na ve, was unaware both of the risks involved in the study and that despite
three hundred clinical trials, gene therapy had never cured anyone.2Researchers instead procured Jesse's
participation by implying that therapy received might combat his disease.
This case proves particularly troubling because of a agrant disregard for the process of informed consent:
federal regulations mandate that potential risks and benets be outlined to patients in lay language and that
if some participants in a study experience grave side eects, all volunteers must be apprised of developments
and consent again. The informed consent form the Gelsingers reviewed, however, excluded mention of mon-
keys' death subsequent to administration of a similar treatment, and when patients suered changes in liver
enzyme levels dire enough to terminate the trial, the consent form remained unrevised. FDA investigations
further reveal that researchers enrolled all eighteen patients without completing eligibility forms and poorly
documented the consent process for half of these subjects. Such aws in informed consent are routine; the
director of the Oce for Protection from Research Risks reports that over 90 percent of cases of alleged abuse
he investigates uncover lapses in informed consent.3 Exacerbating the distress this case evokes is the fact
that the teenager was not seriously ill before his death. His mild liver disorder was controlled adequately
through diet and medication. The incident thus highlights the manner in which optimism divaricates in
clinical trials when researchers hope to discover if novel treatments prove hazardous, yet subjects expect a
cure. Although the population at large generally looks favorably upon biomedical research, this botched
gene therapy study provokes questions concerning the nature of medical progress, the procedures by which
cutting-edge technology is and should be developed, executed, and evaluated, as well as what constitutes
proof of therapeutic ecacy and who should render ecacy determinations.4Researchers' quests for general
2See id.
3See id.
4See Nancy M.P. King and Gail Henderson, Treatments of Last Resort: Informed Consent and the Diusion of New
2progress or a cure now clearly endanger basic values such as human dignity and autonomy, leading Senator
Bill Frist to comment after Congressional hearings on the Gelsinger tragedy that we must confront a mul-
tisystem failure of safeguards currently in place if we are to protect patients.5 Pharmaceutical companies,
researchers, advocacy organizations, and politicians have criticized human experimentation regulation, cur-
rently achieved through a crazy quilt of hortatory codes and maxims, scattered federal laws and regulations
and...Institutional Review Boards (hereafter IRBs).6IRBs and regulations do not suciently entrench the
rights of patient-subjects. While IRBs must exercise heightened vigilance to safeguard vulnerable popu-
lations such as prisoners, children, pregnant women, and the mentally disabled7- i.e. those particularly
susceptible to exploitation and duress due to factors such as diminished decision-making abilities or cap-
tivity of institutionalization- federal regulations utterly fail to provide adequate protections for numerous
groups, including the terminally ill, children, and the mentally disabled. Guidelines additionally have worked
systematically to disadvantage other groups, most notably women. Traditional exclusion of females from
research under protectionist auspices has led to the marketing of medical products posing danger to women
and has deprived seriously ill women of access to experimental treatment oering their only hope of survival.
Modern medical breakthroughs compound the shortcomings of the regulations, for the advent of AIDS and
HIV treatments as well as experimental cancer therapies have rendered access to trials, rather than exclu-
sion, the objective of vulnerable populations. Patients demanding easier access to new therapies willingly
volunteer for unproven treatments. This creates diculty in that patients cannot make informed choices to
try potentially dangerous new technologies due to numerous unknowns involved8and underscores the bifur-
Technology, 42 MERC. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1991).
5See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senators Press for Answers on Gene Trials, N.Y. TIMES, February 3, 2000, at A25.
6Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW.
455, 474 (1996).
7See 45 C.F.R. x46.111(a)(3) (1992).
8See King and Henderson, supra note 4, at 1008-09.
3cation of patients' autonomy and their best interests. As human experimentation has come to be regarded
as benecial rather than suspect, the traditional line between research/experimentation and clinical prac-
tice/therapy has blurred and monetary issues have subordinated concerns for the rights and well-being of
patient-subjects. Informed consent, aimed at promoting autonomy and protecting the individual subject,
crumbles when research participation is oered in a clinical setting. Forthright discussion and deliberation
requisite for meaningful consent is unlikely when patients suer from a therapeutic misconception and when
competing interests, namely those of the scientic community and those of society, exist. The medical
community thus must embrace the need to subject certain research trials to greater scrutiny, and informed
consent must be revamped. A few monolithic standards and regulations guiding procurement of consent are
insucient. Researchers must consider the unique needs and vulnerabilities of dierent groups and adjust
the consent process to respond better to modern research such as gene therapy.
To demonstrate the inadequacies of informed consent in the contemporary context and the need for better
subject protection, this paper begins by scrutinizing the rise of modern informed consent doctrine in in-
ternational legal documents as well as in the United States arena. After examining the federal regulatory
framework governing experimentation with human subjects, considerable attention is given to the doctrine of
informed consent and its shortcomings in the research setting, including lack of competence to grant consent,
misunderstandings and conicts of interest between researcher and subject, and the doctrine's incompati-
bility with several dynamics of the patient-physician encounter. Flaws pertaining to both the research and
therapeutic settings are also noted. IRBs' responsibilities for protecting subjects are then explored, along
with the numerous factors preventing these bodies from providing adequate safeguards. The paper then
discusses current regulations regarding various groups- the terminally ill, women, children, prisoners, and
the decisionally/cognitively impaired, including psychiatric patients and the elderly- as well as considera-
4tions unique to each. This uncovers shortcomings of current informed consent doctrine and illustrates that
meaningful consent can only be achieved by crafting procedures and policies specically tailored to the needs
of each particular population. Next, problems that modern medical research in the gene therapy area raises
are probed, and numerous proposals to ameliorate the informed consent process as well as IRB ecacy are
oered.
The Rise of Human Experimentation Regulation in the International and National Arenas
Legal proceedings in 1947 against Nazi doctors who subjected volunteers to epidemics such as malaria and
typhus, injection with poisons, sterilization, and to various other atrocities led to the announcement of
contemporary ethical principles to govern international research standards, known as the Nuremberg Code.
The Code, consisting of ten principles of human experimentation, agged the dawn of heightened scrutiny
of human subject experimentation.9Its most frequently cited provision is the rst:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential. This means that the person involved should be able
to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of
any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or
other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have
sucient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of
the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an under-
standing and enlightened decision. This...requires that before the
acceptance of an armative decision by the experimental subject
there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and pur-
pose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to
9It may be plausibly argued that public debate in the United States did not immediately ensue. Not until Henry Beecher's
article did the government begin to confront ethical issues pertaining to human subject experimentation. For example, the
Supreme Court rejected the opportunity to adopt Nuremberg Code principles. See Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure
in Human Subject Experimentation, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 157 n.1 (1998).
5be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be
expected, and the eects upon his health...which may...come
from his participation... 10
Placing this ideal in text proved signicant in the wake of the Second World War, during which the United
States committed egregious abuses of individual rights. While the notion of consent had played a role in
American research ethics and law since the 1830's, it was not until the Code that consent principles were
formally reduced to writing.11Consent of the subject is necessary but not sucient under the Code, whose
other guidelines pertain to the welfare of subjects, must be met prior to the seeking of consent, and cannot
be waived.
While the Judges at Nuremberg intended universal application of the document, which remains the most
authoritative script setting international research standards and one of the most eminent human rights man-
ifestos, it has fallen short of its aims. The Code is often regarded as a response to Nazi terror and trivialized
as a context-bound relic no longer helpful in the modern research milieu. Critics contend that the document
proves too demanding, fails to recognize the ideals of scientists, and that its absolutism cannot operate in
conjunction with the impersonal and utilitarian ethics of contemporary medicine.12Furthermore, uncertainty
arises from the Code's opening line stating that voluntary consent of the subject is essential by seemingly
precluding experimentation with emergency patients, children, and the decisionally impaired.
Due to such shortcomings, the World Medical Association has endeavored to unfrock the Code with the
Declaration of Helsinki, promulgated in 1964 and subsequently revised three times. The Declaration consists
of recommendations by physicians to their peers and aims to displace the human rights-based goals of the
10THE NUREMBERG CODE, quoted in Morin, supra note 9, at 172.
11See S. Rebecca Holmes-Farley and Michael Grodin, Foreword: Law, Medicine, and Socially Responsible Research, 24 AM.
J. L. & MED. 153, 153 (1998).
12See Garnett, supra note 6, at 472-73.
6Code with a more indulgent medical ethics agenda tolerating paternalism. Amendments to the document
dropped references to informed consent and added that physicians need not secure a subject's consent to
medical research combined with professional care if they submit a reason for not obtaining consent to an
independent review committee. The Declaration is most notable, however, for beginning to blur the line
between treatment and research by bifurcating research into therapeutic and nontherapeutic, a distinction
referring to whether or not it may prove directly benecial to the subject. With respect to research on
terminal illnesses such as AIDS, this distinction means that research will be deemed therapy. A drawback
of the Declaration as well as the Code it sought to supplant is that both are merely hortatory; neither
possess legal status in most countries nor furnish sanctions or enforcement mechanisms. Both have been
condemned as extremely ambiguous, representing nothing more than 'pious hopes' that doctors will behave
ethically.13 In this country, disregard for groups such as prisoners, the elderly, and the mentally disabled in
no way subsided in the wake of the Nuremberg Code and Declaration of Helsinki. Scrutiny of contemporary
human experimentation in the United States reveals that enforceable domestic regulation was necessary to
curb abuses. The government endorsed regular testing of vaccines for the military on the mentally disabled
without their consent during the Second World War, oering feckless utilitarian justications for experi-
ments contravening human dignity. In 1952-3, an inmate of the New York Psychiatric Institute also died at
the hands of the government, a casualty of the institution's secret contract with the Army Chemical Corps
to conduct research employing a mescaline derivative. The Atomic Energy Commission simultaneously -
nanced studies to demonstrate non-belligerent uses of nuclear energy. In one experiment, investigators used
emotionally disturbed adolescent boys in Massachusetts institutions to examine mineral intake in the human
body by employing minute amounts of radiation in breakfast cereal as a tracer. At one such institution,
13Sharon Perley et al., The Nuremberg Code: An International Overview, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREM-
BERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, at 149, 160 (George J. Annas and Michael A. Grodin,
eds., 1992), quoted in Ileana Dominguez-Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Research and Human
Rights: The Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 245, 274 (1997).
7researchers asked parents to consent to their child's participation in a special program entitled the science
club without being told its true purpose, that ingestion of radiation would occur, and that the research
oered no prospect of medical benet.14Another agrant research abuse that extended no direct benet to
subjects nor contributed to knowledge of their impairment occurred in 1963 with decisionally impaired pa-
tients at the Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, where debilitated residents received live cancer cell
injections without their knowledge. Investigators seeking to gain an understanding of the manner in which
patients with non-cancerous chronic conditions respond to the presence of transplanted cells argued that
failure to seek consent had occurred in more dangerous procedures and that they feared frightening patients.
Other contemporary ethically questionable experiments involved a contraceptive study using impoverished
Mexican-American women who were assured they would receive birth control when half received placebos
and a hepatitis study using inmates of an institution for developmentally disabled children.
In 1966, Henry Beecher authored a landmark article in the New England Journal of Medicine drawing at-
tention to a formidable list of unprincipled research being conducted at the nation's most elite universities.
Discovery of events such as the Tuskegee studies of 1932-72, in which researchers seeking to ascertain the
death rates for untreated cases of syphilis recruited infected black men by promising free treatment but
actually charted the progress of their disease and let them die,15also produced considerable controversy. The
two events spurred development of federal regulations now governing the conduct of human research.
Senate hearings on human experimentation and the passage of the National Research Act of 1974 made the
mid-1970's the dawn of a more comprehensive federal policy on research ethics. This legislation established
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
14See Jonathan D. Moreno, Regulation of Research on the Decisionally Impaired: History and Gaps in the Current Regulatory
System, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 9 (1998).
15Adding to the egregiousness of the study was the denial of treatment after the invention of penicillin in 1947 and the
dissuasion of the subjects from seeking services where they might receive treatment with penicillin for other conditions. See
Holmes-Farley and Grodin, supra note 11, at 187.
8which identied basal ethical precepts that would underlie human research and suggested guidelines for
studies that the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare supported. The fruit of its eorts
yielded the 1979 Belmont Report, which considers the line to be drawn between the practice of biomedical
therapy and research and announces the principles of respect for persons, benecence, and justice as espe-
cially signicant to experimentation with human subjects. The Report explains that respect for persons
involves persons being treated as autonomous agents and individuals with diminished autonomy being en-
titled to protection. Benecence mandates that the harm threatening subjects in a particular study or in
the entire enterprise of research be minimized or mitigated through armative eorts to secure patients'
well-being.16To apply these principles, the Report requires informed consent, risk/benet assessment, and
the appropriate selection of subjects of research as well as equitable distribution of benets of research. For
truly informed consent, the Report mandates that subjects be furnished with enough information, such as
the research procedure, its purpose, potential risks and benets, the existence of alternative procedures, and
statements oering the opportunity to raise questions and to withdraw from the study at any time, to choose
an appropriate course.
The Report, does not, however, address what quantum of information should be provided. Furthermore,
much research may be justied even when subjects are not the direct beneciaries of the research if partic-
ipation in research may lead to both the increase of knowledge as well as to the development of improved
procedures.17Finally, the National Research Act requires that every body applying for a grant or contract
implicating biomedical or behavioral research using human subjects submit assurances satisfactory to the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare that it has established an IRB to review the project and to
safeguard subjects' rights. The Report thus announces a doctrine of informed consent with similar re-
16See Jesse Goldner, An Overview of the Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the Regulatory Implications of
Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 63, 97 (1993).
17See id.
9quirements for therapy and research, the only dierence being that the process for the latter involves IRB
scrutiny. Because experimentation occurs in the realm of the unknown and unproven, however, numerous
features dierentiate it from treatment: risks may not be easily identiable, a subject's consent cannot be
grounded on anticipated benets, researchers and subjects may have diverging interests, and assumptions
are unsubstantiated by scientic evidence. Expertise in this realm is thus more vulnerable than in clinical
practice.18 The Belmont Report's legacy proves remarkable, for the document's distinction between research
and therapy has shaped informed consent ever since its formulation. While federal regulations guiding hu-
man subject research manifest theoretical foundations in the Belmont Report, they struggle with scenarios
involving aspects of both research and therapy. Confusion thus arises about how to categorize interven-
tions defying strict categorization and increases when [research] is conducted on sick subjects because such
research routinely takes place in a clinical setting, where the atmosphere is more conducive to a focus on
the patient's trust of the physician and sometimes less attentive to the subject's right to a full disclosure of
information.19 As federal funding for scientic research increased in the decade prior to the Belmont Report,
FDA and Department of Health and Human Services (hereafter DHHS) also heightened their regulatory
involvement in human research, translating experimentation into a tightly controlled enterprise. As the
regulations currently stand, the 1991 common Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects20governs
activities which any of seventeen federal departments and agencies sponsor. Known as the Common Rule,
the Policy codies 1981 enactments of DHHS regulations which honor the principle of autonomy in informed
consent. DHHS supervises protection of human research subjects utilizing review at the federal and insti-
tutional levels, and to receive research funds, institutions must guarantee in writing that investigators will
18See Morin, supra note 9, at 213.
19Larry R. Churchill, Myra L. Collins, Nancy M.P. King, Stephen G. Pemberton, and Keith A. Wailoo, Genetic Research as
Therapy: Implications of Gene Therapy for Informed Consent, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 38, 39 (1998).
20See 45 C.F.R. x46.101-.409 (1997).
10heed ethical principles of the Belmont Report and requirements of x45 C.F.R. 46. These regulations delin-
eate general protections for all human subjects and additionally permit IRBs to implement supplemental
safeguards for experiments involving vulnerable populations.21They do not, however, reach privately funded
research. Regulations promulgated under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act govern such study aimed at
introducing a new drug or medical device to market. Additionally, all domestic clinical trials involving in-
vestigational drugs are under FDA oversight, regardless of funding source. The joint eect of DHHS and
FDA regulations proves signicant, for federal policy thus controls most human subject and drug research
performed domestically.22 Because society now views exclusion from research as discriminatory denial of
benecial treatment,23federal agencies must contend with demands to loosen research requirements. Related
to such calls for relaxation are concerns that certain populations, such as women and children, have been
systemically banished from protocols and thus cannot reap benets emanating from research. Furthermore,
the practice of experimenting with the desperately ill has fashioned favorable views among clinicians and
patients about therapeutic merits of research. Regulators have responded by hastening the approval process
for promising treatments for life-threatening illnesses, easing access to unapproved therapies, and allowing
desperate use guidelines for gene transfer research. Each of these regulatory responses remove unproven
interventions from the category of research into that of therapy in certain circumstances.
Informed Consent and Its Flaws
The fundamental tenet of informed consent maintains that research may not be performed unless the inves-
tigator has obtained the legally eective informed consent of the subject or the subject's legally authorized
21See 45 C.F.R. x46.109 (1997).
22It should be noted that numerous additional controls operate to regulate the conduct of research apart from those which
directly involve interaction with human subjects. Individual institutional policies, for example, often demand disclosure or
prohibition of nancial conicts of interest, and other federal regulations require suspension of eligibility for nancial assistance
of organizations and individuals who commit nancial abuse. See Goldner, supra note 16, at 89.
23Churchill et al., supra note 19, at 40.
11representative.24Although the researcher must provide an IRB-approved consent form, he may freely discuss
the experiment with the patient, explain terms employed in the consent form, and address any queries of
the subject without Board monitoring. As noted in discussion of the Belmont Report, informed consent for
research is mandatory, yet its incompleteness or comprehensiveness in therapeutic settings varies with the
individual physician. In the latter milieu, physicians are expected to attend only to the welfare of the individ-
ual before them. The doctrine itself is rooted in fundamental values such as autonomy, individuality, bodily
integrity, leading one commentator to note that [i]nformation is power and because information-sharing
inevitably results in decision-making sharing,...informed consent has helped transform the doctor-patient
relationship.25Other aims of informed consent include elevation of rational decision-making, prevention of
fraud and duress, promotion of self-scrutiny by the physician-investigator, and involvement of the public in
signicant issues of health care research and policy. It aims to enrich the physician-patient relationship in
treatment decisions, envisioning an active patient role made possible by informed consideration, deliberation,
and choice.
Informed consent, then, succeeds only when subjects are fully apprised of the potential dangers they chance.
Regulations thus mandate that risks, benets, and alternatives to participation be described and that pa-
tients be advised of procedures that would not be performed but for the research.26Subjects are also to be
told in lay language that a project involves research and advised of the nature of privacy protections as
well as the appropriate person to consult with any questions.27Additionally, researchers must clarify that
participation is voluntary and that refusal to participate will not adversely aect the potential subject.28
2445 C.F.R. x46.116 (1985).
25GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO PATIENT RIGHTS 83 (1989),
quoted in Morin, supra note 9, at 159.
26See 45 C.F.R. x46.116(a)(2)-(4).
27See 45 C.F.R. x46.116(a)(5) and (a)(7).
28See 45 C.F.R. x46.116(a)(8).
12One standard justication for such disclosure obligations is that dangers of research cannot be ascertained
in advance. Experimental settings, more so than those in which standard medical treatments are dispensed,
pose unknown...degrees of risk...[so] there must be broad allowance for personal, idiosyncratic preferences
and values.29Since medical expertise by denition does not exist in research contexts, patients possess no
reason to defer to it. No one proves a better expert than the patient in resolving the core moral concern of
experimentation, i.e. whether he should volunteer his body to augment medical knowledge.30Furthermore,
experimentation often confers little or no gain upon the subject. Informed consent reects a judgment that
most patients possess sucient capacity to comprehend, evaluate, and render decisions regarding their med-
ical condition and future. Unless evidence suggests otherwise, competence to consent is presumed in most
instances.
Numerous factors, however, work to undermine patients' abilities to understand, balance, and render de-
cisions, diminishing their competency to consent. The process of informed consent occurs at a time when
unease often threatens to compromise it. Illness can interfere with a subject's routine thought processes and
hinder him from reaching responsible conclusions. This consideration proves all the more problematic when
stress, pain, side eects of drugs, or fear accompanies sickness. Ramications of an ailment itself may bring
about diminished competence, and physical and emotional consequences of illness may additionally inuence
a patient's perception of information disclosed. Clinicians, then, may be justied in thinking that it is fool-
ish to approach any patient as a capable joint participant in decision-making.31While problems in informed
consent may well emanate from inadequate or nebulous disclosure, shortcomings are likely to arise due to
the doctrine's failure to regard competence as present in degrees, varying over time and under dierent con-
29Richard Delgado and Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation: Bridging the Gap Between Ethical
Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67, 88-89 (1986).
30See id. at 90.
31Frank W.S.M. Verheggen, Myth and Reality of Informed Consent in Clinical Trials, 16 MED. & L. 53, 59 (1997).
13ditions. Federal regulations largely disregard the process by which patients evaluate information presented
to them and supply a generic presumption rather than specic criteria for assessing competence.32Because it
involves assessments of numerous considerations, competence cannot be easily determined. To view consent
as fullled once information has been furnished proves problematic, however, since it wholly ignores under-
lying processes of deliberation.
Inability of the patient to comprehend that motives of physician-investigators conict with his own in the
research setting likewise seriously undermine informed consent's goals. The presence of doctor-investigators
in white coats may lead to mistaken subject beliefs that research being performed is for one's own benet.
Traditionally, the doctor-patient relationship has been characterized as a duciary one premised on honesty,
condence, and good faith. Notions that physicians in therapeutic settings endeavor to achieve as much as
possible for the individual patient seeking medical assistance and that the professional's recommendations are
trustworthy endure. Patients' condence in the benecence of physicians cause the former to regard invita-
tions to participate in research as professional recommendation[s]...intended to serve...individual treatment
interests.33This conviction hinders patients from appreciating that in research, unlike therapy, the research
question proves primary:
It is unlikely that patients can ever see the distinction between
physician and researcher, because most simply do not believe
that their physician would either knowingly do something harmful
to them, or would knowingly use them simply as a means for their
own ends.34
32Id. at 60.
33Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 29 (1993).
34George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation: Nuremberg, Helsinki, and Beyond, 2 HEALTH
MATRIX 119, 130-31(1992).
14Patients often fail to dierentiate between experimentation and therapy, and those with a poor prognosis
may esteem research as a treatment option. The manner in which a physician-investigator presents the
possible advantages of research to a subject aects the degree to which the latter misconstrues the nature of
his participation in a study. Patients thus fail to recognize that the ideology of professionalism, which allows
doctors considerable discretion in rendering decisions for patients due to faith that physician self-interest will
succumb to patients' interests, cannot be applied to clinical research situations since physician-investigators
harbor dual allegiances to subjects as well as the research protocol. Medical professionals confront the
dicult dilemmas of seeking truth for science, benecence for the patient, and self-interest as an individual
investigator.35 Several other dynamics of the physician-patient encounter likewise highlight deciencies in
the current formulation of informed consent. Permeating the doctor-patient relationship are authoritarian
overtones; the assertion that patients cannot comprehend esoteric medical information has often been used
to justify doctors' command over patient needs. Because informed consent's underlying assumption- i.e. that
patient autonomy merits respect- has been alien to the physician mindset throughout medical history,36the
doctrine has not signicantly tempered physician authority in the decision-making process. Independence of
physicians has been preserved at the expense of patients. A power dierential exists even between the most
decisionally capable, sophisticated subject and an investigator, and inevitably the researcher is on top, and
the patient-subject is on the bottom.37This discrepancy is a product of a patient weakened by disease and a
researcher possessing a superior grasp of the relevant medical knowledge. As an aiction grows more serious,
the power imbalance grows more extreme; worsening disease yields desperation, which can render patients
susceptible to manipulation. Further aggravating this situation is the fact that subjects are often recruited
35See Katz, supra note 33, at 30.
36See id. at 20.
37Evan G. DeRenzo, Robert R. Conley, and Raymond Love, Assessment of Capacity to Give Consent to Research Partici-
pation: State-of-the-Art and Beyond, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 66, 77 (1998).
15from dierent age and demographic groups than researchers, typically from those enjoying less power and
economic status than investigators.
Such factors contribute to potential for those holding knowledge to abuse their power, dismiss patients as
irrational, and thus justify paternalism and benecence rather than subject autonomy as controlling guides
for research conduct. Even physicians theoretically dedicated to securing patient consent concede that, in
practice, they exercise laxity in informed consent. Their invitation to a patient to participate is a result of
an already completed, careful consideration of the project's risks and benets as well as their conclusion that
no harm will come to the patient. Thus, investigators may elusively address patient concerns and suggest
that participation is expected or that nontrivial risks are minimal.
Dierences between investigator and patient prove so substantial that the former often fails to regard the
patient as patient, but rather only as a subject. Scientic dedication to objectivity causes investigators'
thought processes to become objectied, transforming human beings under study into data points to be
plotted on a chart that will prove or disprove a research hypothesis.38As cancer researcher James Holland
comments,
Patients have to be subsidiaries of the trial...I'm not interested
in holding patients' hands. I'm interested in curing cancer...
Every patient becomes a piece of scientic data.39
It cannot be doubted, however, that the majority of Holland's patients seek a cure and regard him as their
physician, not merely as a scientist. In this scenario, then, the Declaration of Helsinki's distinction between
therapeutic and non-therapeutic proves empty. Researchers additionally manifest objectivizing tendencies
38Katz, supra note 33, at 33.
39Dena Kleiman, In Search for a Cancer Cure, Patients Come Second, N.Y. TIMES, February 18, 1986, at B1, B7, quoted
in Annas, supra note 34, at 131.
16in their interest in a new treatment's upshot in terms of longevity, while patients often are harbor quality of
life concerns. Furthermore, objectication may grow more extreme through inuence of attitudes on race,
creed, gender, socioeconomic standing, and the scientic imperative of the research.40It should also be noted
that medical research greatly diers from the doctor-patient relationship, traditionally deemed a private,
one-on-one concern. A physician-investigator scarcely becomes acquainted with the patient-subject, and
research fellows, nurses, or non-physician associate investigators may secure consent. The objectication
process thus reinforces diverging values which exist between physician and patient and which may impact
decision-making.
Aside from the aforementioned diculties the research setting poses for ecacy of informed consent, more
general shortcomings also present in the therapeutic context- routinization and costs as well as diculties of
disclosure- undermine the doctrine's goals. Legal medical ethicist Jay Katz argues that in the clinical milieu,
doctors have never accepted informed consent as a route to recognizing patient autonomy, instead merely
tolerating it as a requisite legal duty:41
The result is too often a form of Mirandizing, in which consent
for routine patient care is seen as a legal encumbrance, intro-
duced with words such as, We have to consent you now.42
Such routinization endangers consent in an era when it is most needed, i.e. when investigators oversell gene
therapy research to patients and the media. Consent is likewise jeopardized due to its costs: the process
proves time-consuming, and ensuring that patients genuinely understand what a study entails and why ne-
40See Katz, supra note 33, at 33.
41See Jay Katz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 2 (New York Free Press, 1984), quoted in Churchill
et al., supra note 19, at 42.
42Churchill et al., supra note 19, at 42.
17cessitates more eort than doctors believe they can reasonably invest. Another diculty emanates from
the requirement that professionals disclose alternatives. If the alternative is a treatment that doctor does
not recommend, uncertainty may surround whether the option should be disclosed. Physicians often do
not wish to furnish patients and families with information concerning experimental procedures, concerned
that awareness of an alternative to death is inherently coercive.43Divulging alternatives may open patients
to situational coercion, leaving them incapable of exercising free and informed choice because of societal
pressure to exhaust all possible measures. Thus, when no standard therapy exists, some doctors prefer to
promote acceptance of a fatal outcome rather than to suggest experimental technology.44 Disclosure itself
derives meaning from investigators. Those deeming novel technologies promising rather than experimental
mold disclosure dierently than those who evaluate experimental procedures more cautiously. Disclosure
also proves problematic when a researcher provides too much information; if asked to digest huge quantities
of complex knowledge, a patient will be overwhelmed rather than educated and cannot ask questions because
he does not understand enough even to formulate them. Striking a balance in terms of the quantum of in-
formation to disclose is dicult, for a doctor who reveals too little out of concern for encumbering a patient
may foreclose the latter's ability to make decisions in which his needs are inconsistent with that which the
physician thinks best. Additionally, the situation in which disclosure occurs merits attention. When consent
is sought under humiliating or insulting conditions, it cannot be labeled informed. The net result of afore-
mentioned considerations is generally informed compliance as opposed to informed consent: doctors render
decisions concerning the type of treatment patients should have and then supply whatever information in
whatever setting is necessary for assent.45 The legal system's failure to aord eective remedies to patients
43King and Henderson, supra note 4, at 1041.
44For example, heart transplantation and surgical palliation of hypoplastic left heart syndrome is a last resort measure to
treat a defect that is inevitably fatal, usually within weeks. One doctor expresses concern that if she reveals the procedure's
availability to parents, they will feel pressured to pursue it and experience guilt if they do not try everything possible to save
their child's life. See King and Henderson, supra note 4, at 1036.
45See Katz, supra note 33, at 17 n.34.
18injured by inadequate informed consent further contributes to the doctrine's impotence. Consent regulations
provide no adequate remedy to patient-subjects for a researcher's or institution's breach. While subjects
suering harm in the course of research due to a failure to obtain informed consent may receive medical
and psychological treatment from the institution, regulations do little for victims of unconsented-to study.
While some argue that a private cause of action can be inferred from the regulations,46no appellate court
has addressed this possibility. No court yet has provided recourse for infringement upon a subject's right of
choice without physical or emotional injury, suggesting that current case law cannot suciently safeguard
subjects' rights to informed consent. Courts appear recalcitrant to place sanctions on researchers who are
experts in their elds and endeavor to better medical and social science.
Whereas compensatory justice mandates that society indemnify subjects for research-related injuries since
they assume a position of risk on behalf of society,47patients experience tremendous diculty obtaining
legal redress since determining the scope of required disclosure proves problematic for courts. To establish
physician negligence in obtaining consent, a plainti must demonstrate that a patient-physician relation-
ship existed, a physician had a duty to disclose certain information, the physician failed to provide this
information, and the failure to do so cannot be excused. A showing must additionally be made that if the
professional had provided the patient with the undisclosed information, the patient would not have con-
sented to treatment, and that the failure to disclose constitutes the proximate cause of injury and damages
claimed.48Causation often is the most dicult element to prove, established when the injured can demon-
strate that he would not have assented if proper disclosure occurred. Negligent disclosure, furthermore, is
determined in many states according to a professional standard. Disclosure is thus often viewed as a concern
46Delgado and Leskovac, supra note 29, at 80.
47See James F. Childress, The National Bioethics Advisory Commission: Bridging the Gaps in Human Subjects Research
Protection, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 105, 117 (1998).
48See Morin, supra note 9, at 160.
19of medical judgment, determined by what a reasonable physician under the same circumstances would reveal.
Institutional Review Boards and Their Shortcomings
Like informed consent, IRBs seek to safeguard the welfare and rights of subjects. DHHS regulations mandate
that proposed clinical research undergo review of an IRB, a body which determines whether and on what
terms medical experimentation involving human beings may be conducted. Boards function as peer review
committees ensuring that research studies are scientically sound, well-designed, safe, and that potential
benets outweigh possible risks those under study. To perform such duties, these bodies must be composed
of members with sucient scientic expertise to appraise the research protocol as well as the researcher's
abilities. In reviewing experiment proposals, IRBs must determine that dangers to the subject are minimized,
selection of subjects is equitable, risks are reasonable in relation to anticipated benets, appropriate informed
consent will be secured and carefully documented for each subject, and that if necessary, the research plan
will include monitoring of data.
Boards are expected to consider the nature, content, and design of the study, ethical guidelines of the Bel-
mont Report, and where appropriate, the regulatory mandates of DHHS and FDA.49IRBs also must conduct
a continuing review of every study at least annually as well as check the informed consent document provided
to each subject, ensuring it contains all factors mentioned in federal regulations. They may, however, waive
the informed consent requirement for research entailing only minimal risk if the waiver will not adversely
impact subject rights and welfare.50Boards additionally must also heed specic regulations aording addi-
tional protections to research involving vulnerable subjects, i.e. children, prisoners, pregnant women, [and]
handicapped or mentally disabled persons.51Federal guidelines suggest that IRBs exercise special caution
49See 45 C.F.R. x46.103.
50See 45 C.F.R. x46.117(c).
51See 45 C.F.R. x46.107(a) (1992).
20in safeguarding the interests of these subjects by including an individual knowledgeable and experienced in
working with these subjects52as one of its members.
Because IRBs act as representatives of the broader local community acceptance of an experiment's particu-
lar risk/benet ratio, federal regulations also devote attention to the composition and operating procedures
of such bodies. IRBs must consist of at least ve individuals of varying backgrounds. One must possess
primarily scientic interests, one must hold primarily nonscientic interests, and one must lack aliations
with the research institution. A quorum, with at least one member whose concerns are nonscientic, must
be present for any vote. Diverse membership aims to safeguard the rights and welfare of subjects eectively;
detailed rules additionally mandating that [e]very...eort be made to ensure that no IRB consists entirely of
men or entirely of women and that more than one profession be represented further this goal.53Lay members
theoretically function as watchmen, defending against excessive zeal of scientists and providing a link with
the norms of the local population. A majority of IRB members rather than subcommittees or delegees,
furthermore, must study research proposals at regularly scheduled meetings. IRBs thus reect a judgment
that medical progress should move forward, yet without relegating the interests of human study participants.
IRBs as currently congured, however, protect the institution and its investigator rather than shield research
subjects. The majority of the Board's members serve on the faculty of the institutions to which the investiga-
tor belongs. Not only do these individuals share concerns and objectives similar to those of the investigator,
but they also recognize that just as they now sit in judgment of a research proposal, their own protocols will
be subjected to the same scrutiny. It thus proves improbable that Board members will demand from other
experimenters a standard of disclosure and consent that insulates human research subjects if doing so will
tighten the conduct of research. IRBs therefore do not address problems common to many studies, including
52Id.
5345 C.F.R. x46.107(b)-(d) (1992).
21inadequate dierentiation between trivial and non-trivial risks, manipulation of subject consent, insucient
highlighting of the severity of foreseeable risks and nondisclosure of their probability, scant discussion of
risks and benets of non-participation,54and consent forms which inate possible benets or are otherwise
decient.
Boards typically strictly focus on risk-benet ratios as well as on consent forms, rendering them less likely
to promote meaningful consent. Approved consent forms often do not furnish relevant information in un-
derstandable language, and an IRB that determines that research poses only minimal risk and subsequently
waives the consent requirement deprives the subject of any role in deciding whether risks are minimal or of
his desire to be advised of possible trivial risks. Federal regulations thus implicitly allow researchers and
IRBs to choose when a prospective human subject may exercise his autonomy.55Furthermore, IRB focus on
consent forms and requirements contribute to little evaluation of the merits of research, a deciency also
attributable to members bearing institutional loyalties who get caught between desires to safeguard subjects
and to advance their institutions. Composition of the IRB itself likewise promotes institutional rather than
subject concerns, for dominance by researchers fosters a systematic bias favoring experimentation. As Pro-
fessor Robert Veatch explains, it also proves dicult to involve a scientically-dominated group in assessment
of whether a research protocol accords with standards of community acceptance:
The problem is not one of lacking condence or trust in the
goodwill of the scientists. Trusting scientists to decide about the
value of knowledge is a bit like trusting a rabbi friend to pick a
good Easter ham. He is to be trusted as a person of goodwill,
but he is simply not the appropriate person to ask.56
54See Katz, supra note 33, at 51.
55See Delgado and Leskovac, supra note 29, at 123.
56Robert Veatch, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON IRBs: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH, 9 HASTINGS CTR.
REPORT 22, 26 (1979), quoted in Goldner, supra note 16, at 106.
22Additional shortcomings of IRBs emanate from changes in the research environment as well as increased
workloads. The current framework for IRB practices was fashioned in the 1970's, when one investigator
usually performed research and worked under government funding with a small group of human subjects in
a university teaching hospital.57Contemporary experimentation, however, is quite dierent due to increased
commercialization and private funding of research, explosion of managed care, use of multi-site trials, an
increase in patient consumerism, and escalating numbers of research protocols.58Such changes have placed
tremendous strains on IRBs, which have acquired additional responsibilities and mountains of paperwork.
Boards must now grapple with complex novel issues bearing signicant societal implications, such as genetic
research. Resource constraints combine with these factors to render IRB monitoring of a study's progress
following approval virtually nonexistent and to preclude Boards from going beyond their most perfunctory
requirements. Federal guidelines promote a rushed atmosphere where thoughtful evaluation often proves im-
possible, and Boards inundated with protocols and adverse event reports cannot devote sucient attention
to each review.59These bodies rarely perform on-site monitoring of research conduct, relying on an honor
system. They are also largely incapable of monitoring possible conicts of interest of researchers, a problem
plaguing gene therapy experiments.
Aforementioned hardships facing IRBs contribute to their inability to protect vulnerable subjects unable to
defend their own interests in the informed consent process. No national consensus or consistent guidelines
exist, for example, on what constitutes proper safeguards for individuals with progressive dementias such
as Huntington's and Alzheimer's diseases.60Thus, cognitively impaired research subjects must look to IRBs
57See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH
SUBJECTS: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS 22 (April 2000).
58See id.
59See id.
60See Alison Wichman, Protecting Vulnerable Research Subjects: Practical Realities of Institutional Review Board Review
and Approval, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 88, 94 (1998).
23for protection. Consequently, Boards should devote special care to considering the nature and degree of
impairment, prospective risks and discomforts of participation, and the potential for direct benet to the
individual subject. Increased workloads, resource constraints, and problems created by institutional loyal-
ties, however, preclude IRBs from making such careful determinations. Signicant evidence suggests, for
example, that Boards are unlikely to compensate for the lack of particular regulations pertaining to the cog-
nitively impaired through a proactive use of their discretionary authority.61IRBs do not review the details
of investigator-subject interaction, thus depriving groups especially vulnerable to coercion of much-needed
protection and devoting inadequate attention to these groups' assumptions of trust in physician-researchers.
The Terminally Ill
Federal regulations do not classify the terminally ill as a vulnerable population, yet thorny consent issues
arise from the fact that many research subjects are vulnerable merely because they are ill. Individuals
suering from malignant disorders or plagued by ailments refractory to other treatment often desperately
seek inclusion in clinical trials evaluating the ecacy of novel drugs and drug combinations as well as of
uncorroborated practices. Vulnerability of such patient-subjects varies with the gravity of illness as well as
their degree of desperation. Cancer and AIDS, for example, arguably are the two most feared ways of dying
in the developed world, perceived not just as lethal, but as dehumanizing, literally so.62A terminal diagnosis
itself shapes what researchers as well as patients regard as reasonable, both often believing that the dying
person has nothing to lose. In confronting certain illnesses, it additionally proves impossible for a researcher
to render the requisite boilerplate language of the federal regulations candidly, as experimental therapies are
the only available treatments and refusal to participate without penalty, i.e. imminent death, is impossible.
Even if consent forms possess clarity and accuracy, conversations with patients may render issues nebulous.
61See Jonathan D. Moreno, supra note 14, at 14.
62SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 126 (1989), quoted in Annas, supra note 34, at 127.
24Desperately ill subjects may selectively listen, absorbing only facts about prospective benets, and investi-
gators anxious to recruit volunteers may address risks in a cursory manner. Dying persons thus may not
truly be free to render autonomous decisions, captive to their disease and thus under coercion of their illness
and potentially of others. As a former editor of The New England Journal of Medicine observes, the thumb
screws of coercion are most relentlessly applied [to] the most used and useful of all experimental subjects,
the patient with disease.63Likewise, as a one's disease grows more severe, his capacity to retain information
from the consent procedure decreases.
Diagnosis of a terminal illness usually spurs a signicant psychological reaction in patients and sometimes
causes a variety of psychopathologies.64Physiological symptoms may exacerbate psychological hardships.
This combines with patients' reluctance to question their physicians to reduce the capability of a terminally
ill patient to engage in autonomous, rational decision-making. Cancer patients, for example, commonly
experience sentiments of inadequacy, fear, anxiety, confusion, and hopelessness, dreading the six D's: de-
pendency, death, disgurement, disability interfering with normal life functions, disruption of relationships,
and discomfort or pain resulting from the disease. Their disease itself may directly hinder cognitive ability:
fatigue, toxicity of medication, and recovery from radiation can impair the speed and quality of thought
processes. One who is hospitalized for an extended period of time may additionally respond to his environ-
ment in a manner hindering his ability to render informed decisions. Sleep deprivation commonly associated
with hospital stays, for example, exaggerates the emotional and physical trauma of terminal illness and may
create confusion, disorientation, and memory disturbance.65Just as prisoners prove wholly dependent on
guards and other jail employees for their well-being, the terminally ill often depend completely on hospital
63F.J. Ingelnger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEW ENG. J. MED. 465, 466 (1972), quoted in Annas, supra
note 34, at 127.
64See D. Christian Addicott, Regulating Research on the Terminally Ill: A Proposal for Heightened Safeguards, 15 J. CON-
TEMP. L. & POL'Y 479, 496 (1999).
65See id. at 501.
25sta and researchers. Consequently, such patients endeavor to gain favor with researchers and to eschew
behavior they fear might provoke retaliation.
While such environmental and psychological diculties may make it virtually impossible to balance log-
ically the advantages and disadvantages of participating in potentially hazardous research, concerns also
arise that the dying, having abandoned all hope, may assent to immoral or unduly unwise experiments when
experimenters exploit potential subjects' despair or incapacity. Oncologists, for example, justify employing
countless approved drugs for unapproved uses with claims that they are simply responding to the desires of
their dying patients. But as one physician to cancer patients remarks,
This argument abandons the scientic basis for medical
practice and could just as well be used to justify quackery.
Also, one wonders how many patients with advanced pan-
creatic cancer...would really demand cytotoxic drugs if the
sheer futility of such therapy was honestly explained.66
Depression may likewise contribute to willingness to consent, rendering the signicance of risk meaning-
less. Such a nothing to lose attitude among experimenters, however, proves most problematic: patients
confronting imminent death are real people, not objects, who may treasure quality of life over its length.
When a researcher deems a study useful or necessary, he may opt not to scrutinize the act of consent for
fear of losing precious research resources.
Respect for autonomy supercially suggests that the desperately ill should be aorded considerable freedom
to consent to experimental study participation. The terminally ill stress liberty to control one's body, a par-
ticularly acute concern when no alternative treatments to investigational therapy exist. Autonomy, however,
is not absolute; drug regulation involves a dilemma between the competing concerns of scientic validation
and individual choice. FDA thus faces the nettlesome task of weighing societal goals against each person's
freedom, for every time access is broadened, science is jeopardized.67Patients willing to forego thorough
67See Lois K. Perrin, The Catch-22 for Persons with AIDS: To Have or Not to Have Easy Access to Experimental Therapies
and Early Approval for New Drugs, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 153 (1995).
26scientic validation of a treatment are denied access, yet selecting a course of treatment is an important
consideration for the seriously ill. Traditional FDA policies require that a drug be proven safe and eective
prior to distribution in interstate commerce and bar access to investigational therapies for noninvestigational
ends. To respect autonomy more eectively, however, the Administration has allowed the sale of certain drugs
still under investigation for AIDS patients and has promulgated regulations allowing marketing of drugs of
unknown safety if benets appear substantial. Such policies reduce the length of time necessary to test drugs
for severely debilitating diseases, have revolutionized access to novel treatments for life-threatening diseases,
and minimize dierences between access to experimental drugs and to investigational procedures.
This vindication of autonomy, however, forces doctors as well as patients to render dicult decisions in the
absence of substantial information. More troubling is that FDA's loosening of its drug approval procedures
partially emanates from compassion toward those unable to survive long enough to wait for exhaustive testing
of new therapies. Compassionate motivations can interfere with the furnishing of information and preclude
straightforward conversations between patient and experimenter about the reasonable likelihood of success.
They additionally may bury the character of an intervention and sacrice the researcher's complete consid-
eration of the project at hand. Most signicantly, however, they further obscure the profound dierence
between the scientic alliance between researcher and subject and the therapeutic alliance between doctor
and patient, rendering the distinct roles of each party to these relationships indistinguishable.68 Just as the
compassion argument proves awed, scrutiny of experience with the drug AZT displays signicant shortcom-
ings of claims for greater access to experimental therapy premised upon autonomy and highlights the need
for research performed in a systematic, scientic manner. AIDS is seen as an illness in which there is no
distinction between experimentation and treatment since no cure exists. The disease overwhelmingly plagues
the young, hastening a premature and certain death. Many aicted thus are willing to disregard dangers
68See Churchill et al., supra note 19, at 41.
27associated with experimentation for even remotest chance of therapeutic gain. In the absence of alterna-
tives, the importance of individual autonomy appears to supercede the government interest in safeguarding
overall health. As AIDS activists clamored for increased access to experimental therapies, the public began
to appreciate the tangible benets research participants enjoy, including possible therapeutic advantages
when other treatments prove ineective, contact with eminent physicians, and careful monitoring of one's
disease. Participation in clinical trials came to be regarded as a boon rather than a bane against which to
be protected, further blurring the line between research and therapy. ACT-UP's slogan, A Drug Trial is
Health Care Too, indeed encouraged AIDS victims to procure experimentation as treatment and researchers
to deem AIDS patients potential subjects with nothing to lose. FDA bowed to pressures to expand access
as well as to hasten new drug approvals, granting AZT fast-track treatment since initial studies suggested it
was eective in combating AIDS.
Later evidence, however, demonstrated that this highly toxic substance with dire adverse eects cannot be
tolerated by many patients and may furnish only eeting benets. Merely four of one hundred patients
experience a slower progression of the disease,69meaning that FDA's allowance of greater access to AZT may
have caused many to rely on a substance not nearly as ecacious as initially promised. If, as with AZT,
patients pin hopes on the rst drug to oer promise, they may sacrice other innovations altogether. Absent
a subject population to test the safety of alternative potential cures, new treatments cannot be established
unless the initial treatment is clearly ineective. The AIDS epidemic additionally evinces that the dangers of
experimental drugs cannot be overemphasized: unocial trials involving an ingredient known as Compound
Q lacked safeguards such as an IRB and resulted in numerous fatalities.
The AZT story likewise demonstrates the diculty of securing informed consent due to the blurring of the
research/ therapy line. Terminally ill patients advised that medicine cannot oer them any hope come to re-
69See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 13, at 259.
28gard experimental protocols as treatment. Instead of approaching experimentation with skepticism, they may
demand access to such interventions as a right; in such instances, informed consent aords no profound pro-
tection. Terminally ill research subjects commonly fail to comprehend that they are participating in research
that may not be intended primarily for their benet, a phenomenon termed the therapeutic misconception.
Self-deception in viewing experimentation as treatment, particularly evident in terminally ill cancer patients,
proves readily apparent in Phase I drug studies with anticancer agents. FDA regulations state that such inves-
tigations are not intended to possess any therapeutic content, yet the National Cancer Institute labels them
potentially therapeutic. 70Furthermore;nearlyanyinterventioncanbeportrayedaspotentiallytherapeutic;transformingnonbeneficialstudiessuchasPhaseItrials;inwhich94%ofinvestigatorsagreetheirpatientsenrollmostlyforthepossiblemedicalbenefit;71into
therapy. Deception enables researchers as well as subjects to double themselves, the former seeing them-
selves as physicians and the latter deeming themselves patients.72 When the physician and researcher are
embodied in the same person, it proves unlikely that patients can ever distinguish between these two con-
icting roles, unable to fathom that their doctor would consciously employ them as a means for his own
ends. Physician-investigators have long asserted that clinical research and therapy are inextricable, that
drugs and therapies they scrutinize in scientic studies could be oered to patients in scientic settings, and
that the sole distinction between their research and clinical endeavors lies in the objective evaluation of ef-
fectiveness and risk-benets to which they submit their interventions.73Many likewise maintain that patients
70See George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal, and Self-Deception in Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 297, 310-11 (1996).
71Eric Kodish et al., Ethical Issues in Phase I Oncology Research: A Comparison of Investigators and Institutional Review
Board Chairpersons, 10 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1810, 1812 (1992), quoted in id. at 311.
72Another diculty surrounding consent which AIDS and AZT highlight is the practice of administering placebos to a control
group. One cannot help but question the ethical propriety of withholding the only potential treatment from terminally ill patients
to acquire accurate data for future generations. In 1997, US-sponsored HIV research involving AZT in developing countries
attracted considerable criticism since clinical trials involved placebo-controlled testing among pregnant HIV+ subjects. It is
dicult to accept that patients will consent to participation in such studies if truly informed consent about risks and alternatives-
namely that placebos oer no protection- occurs. Justications for withholding information on placebos, including that the
investigator does not know with certainty that placebo is inferior as well as that a patient will grow distressed if she learns she
is being given a less desirable treatment, clearly undermine goals of promoting autonomy and informed choice.
73See Katz, supra note 33, at 12.
29are exposed to unscientically proven, ineective, and potentially hazardous therapies in clinical practice,
about which patients learn little since their doctor believes in these therapies and many other professionals
share their physician's unsubstantiated beliefs. Clinical research, investigators posit, diers from therapy
solely in that it seeks not to perpetuate scientic unknowns, but to resolve uncertainties. To the extent
that patient-subjects assume that physician-researchers act in their best interests, then, informed consent
constitutes little more than a ction. For the terminally ill who do attempt to ponder the risks of research,
their decision-making capacity is nevertheless impaired by the psychological and physiological eects of their
sickness.
Our quest for a formula that will banish death seems to make it acceptable to try questionable regimens on
the...terminally ill...Those who insist on using the dying as experimental subjects...see death as abnor-
mal and dying patients as subhuman.74We must cease treating the terminally ill as subhuman by oering
them dubious experiments under the guise of therapy. Such an oer cannot be justied by their demands
for autonomy or by our belief that knowledge gained will benet mankind. Researchers who believe their
subjects have nothing to lose by participating in experimental studies should be disqualied from performing
such research, for they are unable to protect the welfare of their subjects adequately. Similarly, subjects
harboring the same sentiments and desperate due to their malady should be disallowed to participate since
they cannot furnish competent, informed, and uncoerced consent.
Despite their nonmention in federal regulations, the terminally ill arguably constitute our most vulnerable
population and need many more safeguards than currently provided. Not only should federal regulations
explicitly classify the terminally ill as a vulnerable population, but research on this class should also be
prohibited unless it potentially oers therapeutic benets to individual subjects. Patients should receive
condential psychological evaluations prior to participation in studies, IRBs should be required to consult
74Ralph Brauer, The Promise That Failed, N.Y. TIMES, August 28, 1988, sec. 6 (magazine) at 34, 76, quoted in Annas,
supra note 34, at 134.
30with a representative devoted to safeguarding their rights, researchers should be trained to recognize the
psychological troubles plaguing those facing imminent death, and subject advocates should be available to
assist the terminally ill during the informed consent process.75The terminally ill share several characteristics
of other vulnerable populations: like children, their ability to make informed decisions is frequently impaired,
and like prisoners, they are captives of their sickness, the hospital, and their doctor. Absent explicit reg-
ulatory classication of the terminally ill as vulnerable, numerous researchers and IRBs will disregard the
susceptibility of the terminally ill. Even those scientists who appreciate vulnerability of their patients may
not take adequate care to respond to the particular psychological trauma that a terminal diagnosis causes.
Recognizing the frangibility of the terminally ill would hardly impact the rapidity with which research is
conducted and thus would not signicantly lessen the societal benets of such research. General regulations
applicable to vulnerable populations are essentially unobtrusive for IRBs and researchers alike.76Categorizing
the terminally ill as vulnerable likewise will not endanger their autonomy and dignity. Rather, it will demand
they be regarded as complete individuals battling the psychological eects of their illnesses, but who are
entitled to render their own informed decisions. Regardless of agreement with the aforementioned proposals
on how to protect the terminally ill more eectively, one must concede that scrutiny of this class of subjects
emphasizes that [i]nevitably, regulation of human research involves tradeos between the personal autonomy
and rights of research subjects, potential benets to society, and the need to prevent research abuse [and
that] [r]easonable people...dier as to how this balance should be struck.77
Women
Whereas the terminally ill suer from underprotection, women have traditionally been disadvantageously
75See Addicott, supra note 64, at 481.
76See id. at 510.
77Id. at 524.
31overprotected and systematically excluded or underrepresented in clinical research studies. Because of their
reproductive capabilities, women and their potential fetuses have been regarded as meriting safeguards from
the possible hazards of experimentation. This policy of fetal protection, opines one author, results from intel-
lectual lassitude, defensive legalism, and a misplaced sense of obligation.78Researchers routinely deem female
subjects more vulnerable than male ones and assume that unvalidated treatments present unique reproduc-
tive hazards to all women. They frequently label pregnant individuals incapable of eectively weighing risks
to a fetus against their own well-being and therefore deny these women the chance to participate in studies,
regardless of the true level of risk involved. Research protocols typically ostracize nursing and pregnant
women as well as females of childbearing age; the few that welcome pre-menopausal women strictly regulate
their reproductive activities. Recent GAO investigations reveal that numerous clinical trials funded by the
NIH were designed to include women, but not in numbers high enough to allow analysis that would deni-
tively measure dierent outcomes for men and women.79 The assumption that female physiology diverges
from the norm has proven damaging in medical research, for it deems results accurate only for (white) men
scientically acceptable and thus perpetuates the practice of banning women from clinical trials for the sake
of simplicity. Researchers often posit that the male body is less complex and that it is therefore easier to
study men and generalize ndings to women rather than to perform research on women directly. One study
on links between obesity and breast as well as uterine cancer, for example, employed only male research
subjects since experimenters believed their work could be performed more rapidly on nonmenstruating indi-
viduals. Another study on the eects of aspirin in reducing heart attack likewise involved twenty-thousand
males yet no females. Desires to conduct studies with homogeneous populations and concomitant concerns
78Jonathan D. Moreno, Ethical Issues Related to the Inclusion of Women of Childbearing Age in Clinical Trials, in WOMEN
AND HEALTH RESEARCH (A. Mastroianni, R. Faden, D. Federman, eds., vol. 2, 1994) 29, quoted in Karen L. Baird, The
New NIH and FDA Medical Research Policies: Targeting Gender, Promoting Justice, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 531,
532 (1999).
79Robert Pear, Research Neglects Women, Studies Find, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 2000, at A16 (col. 4).
32for cost-eectiveness repeatedly have been oered as justications for passing over groups other than white
men in medical research. Perceptions of the middle-aged male as the common breadwinner and stress on
the economic costs of health care may also have contributed to overemphasis of concern on men's health.
Researchers likewise label women unreliable, unlikely to follow through with research protocols because of
child care demands or because they may become pregnant. As policymakers as well as researchers prioritize
issues resounding with their personal concerns, it proves additionally problematic that in a scientic commu-
nity which funds what it fears, women comprise a minority of medical researchers and a minute percentage
of those making funding decisions.
These general rationales for excluding and underrepresenting women do not withstand scrutiny. It dees
logical consistency to contend both that women are dierent from men due to their hormonal cycle as well
as their ability to become pregnant and that females are similar enough to males to apply clinical research
ndings gleaned from studying the latter easily to them. Furthermore, the practice of generalizing nd-
ings to women undercuts their unique health care needs, for some illnesses manifest themselves dierently
or exclusively in women. An additional shortcoming of the protectionist rationale is that it assumes an
adversarial relationship between a woman and her fetus, premised upon the belief that fetuses necessitate
protection from their carriers. It consequently destroys a woman's right to control her pregnancy as well as
her decision-making freedom.80Experimenters have long oered potential pregnancy, however remote, as a
rationale for banishing all women from research protocols, yet automatic exclusion without substantiation
of harm to the pregnant individual is unnecessary. Drop-out rates likewise can be factored into any study.
More eective methods to achieve homogeneity, furthermore, exist; use of gender and race to obtain this
end are simplistic, weak proxies. AIDS research, for example, reveals that accurate indices of homogeneity
include dening a range of T-cell values or other virologic and hematologic abnormalities characteristically
80See Hayley Gorenberg and Amanda White, O the Pedestal and Into the Arena: Toward Including Women in Experimental
Protocols, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 205, 210 (1992).
33associated with the illness.81 Such general exclusionary rationales may prove awed, yet drug trial sponsors
frequently cite possible exposure to tort liability as a rationale for eliminating women from trials. The pri-
mary source of concern lies in fear of potential damage to ospring, a result of the Thalidomide debacle of
the 1950's in which thousands were born with birth defects and many stillbirths occurred.82The next decade
saw discovery of complications of DES, which caused many daughters of women who had taken the drug to
develop reproductive abnormalities as well as a heightened risk of vaginal cancer. Suits brought by these o-
spring proved costly to the pharmaceutical industry, provoking protectionist policies which in turn ironically
hurt those intended to be safeguarded. Whatever liability risk exists in research, however, may be contained
through informed consent. Judicial precedent demonstrates that without other negligence, informed consent
acts as a shield against liability. Warnings, including disclosure of possible harms to the fetus, furnished
during the informed consent process both maximize autonomous decisionmaking and minimize chances of
recovery in tort actions for research injury. Additionally, the low incidence of such injury nearly eliminates
likelihood of liability imposition.
Chances for liability are indeed minimal. The most notable instances of liability involving women as ex-
perimental subjects turned not upon eects on ospring, but upon failure to secure subjects' informed
consent.83Only three reported cases implicate alleged research injuries to ospring resulting from clinical
study participation, and in all instances, pregnant subjects did not consent to participate in research.84Such
precedent thus does not delineate the boundaries of liability for harm to children when a woman has legally
consented to participate in a clinical study. It additionally proves unclear whether securing a mother's consent
81See id. at 214.
82These exclusionary policies prove misguided since they fail to address the root of the problem. The thalidomide crisis, for
example, may have been averted through controlled, pre-marketing research. See id. at 208.
83See id. at 226.
84See Anna C. Mastroianni, HIV, Women, and Access to Clinical Trials: Tort Liability and Lessons from DES, 5 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 167, 176 (1998).
34suces to eschew liability for injury to ospring, for an unborn child does not possess the capacity to consent.
While one cannot deny that trials must be meticulously crafted with tort liability in mind, the search for a
cure simply cannot exclude women.85 Ironically, banishing women from clinical studies may in fact expose
drug manufacturers to liability.86Liability for exclusion may occur when a woman takes a drug untested on
her sex which proves more hazardous or less ecacious in females once marketed. Case law indicates that
insucient study constitutes grounds for imposing liability according to negligence and strict liability princi-
ples. Manufacturers face strict liability due to defective product design, and decient testing may be deemed
a design defect. Manufacturers likewise must warn about predictable risks that should be known, a require-
ment that can be met only with sophisticated product testing. Claims that a drug is unavoidably unsafe may
be undercut if it is not tested on women but has damaging results, and liability can attach from lack of data
requisite to determine appropriate protections for treatment of women. Clinical trial sponsors thus cannot
eschew tort liability by omitting women in their childbearing years from protocols, rendering decisions to
exclude these women from studies or to ignore the possibility that they may become pregnant while taking
a marketed drug dangerous.87 Depriving women of access to clinical research and treatment additionally
fuels possible charges of gender discrimination, for the Supreme Court has fortied a woman's prerogative
to make choices aecting reproductive status.88Recognition in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,89a Title VII
85Id. at 191.
86Doctors may additionally incur liability for delivering treatments without informed consent since the possibilities for harm
caused by drugs are unknown and patients do not anticipate being given untested medication or participating in de facto
experiments when they visit their doctor. By excluding women from clinical trials, liability is not eliminated but instead passed
from researchers to physicians, who become susceptible to malpractice suits for administering drugs with scarce knowledge of
potential ramications.
87Interestingly, drug manufacturers additionally court liability by failing to study possible male reproductive consequences of
experimental drugs.
88See Karen H. Rothenberg, Gender Matters: Implications for Clinical Research and Women's Health Care, 32 HOUS. L.
REV. 1201, 1242 (1996).
89499 U.S. 187 (1991).
35challenge to a fetal protection workplace policy, that diverging applications of privileges to the sexes consti-
tute gender discrimination and that choices aecting future children are rightly made by those who conceive
and bear these children provides a foundation from which to attack dierences in clinical research premised
upon sex. Court rejection of fetal safeguarding bolsters the claim that prohibiting female participation in
experiments for reproductive reasons is discrimination against women as women.90Possibility of liability for
banning female trial participation again highlights an evolving view of participation in research as a benet,
if not a right, presenting nontrivial opportunities for direct medical gain.
Blanket exclusion of women from clinical trials must be labeled unconscionable because of the severe harm it
works upon countless women. Physicians wishing to prescribe to female patients drugs untested on women
are left to guess at appropriate dosages, possible side eects, and ecacy. Post-marketing studies of drugs are
not required to secure drug licensing, meaning that women serve as marketplace guinea pigs, experimented
upon by their doctors.91Furthermore, the virtual absence of female participants in medical research yields
a general scarcity of information pertaining to women's medical care and consequently of knowledge crucial
to their health and well-being. Doctors are sometimes slow to appreciate hazardous drug combinations for
women- one example being the disproportionate occurrences of dangerous heart rhythm abnormalities that
concomitant use of Seldane and erythromycin or ketoconazole causes - for a mere 15% of published research
contains any analysis of the dierences in results for women and men.92Knowledge of a drug's eects upon
the expectant mother's unique physiology is likewise crucial for healthy pregnancies. Treatments that can
save or extend her life, if endangered, may furnish the sole opportunity to protect the life of her fetus. The
90See Rothenberg, supra note 88, at 1243.
91See Gorenberg and White, supra note 80, at 222.
92See Pear, supra note 79.
36consent process aords the pregnant individual an opportunity to render informed, free decisions, thus pro-
moting equality, autonomy, and self-determination in research as well as reducing manufacturers' likelihood
of facing successful liability claims.
More fundamental, however, are the troubles emanating from employing the male body as a reference for
judgments about the average individual. The practice renders the female experience of menstruation, hor-
monal cycles, and pregnancy exceptional rather than commonplace.93Disregarding material variables which
entangle homogeneity may inltrate studies with signicant error, yet women desire and require accurate
information about illnesses and conditions which aict them. Such information can also promote women's
health in general. As research enables us to enjoy healthier lives, and healthier individuals are better able
to develop their capacities and talents, health can be regarded as none other than a rst-order need.94 The
eect of the AIDS epidemic upon the female population also vividly illustrates the importance of gender-
specic information. Failure to include adequate numbers of women in clinical studies of HIV and AIDS has
detrimentally impacted the health of females suering from the illness. When women have been at the center
of AIDS research, it is usually to determine the most eective manner to bar or mitigate transmission of HIV
to a fetus, rather than how to best treat gender-specic manifestations of HIV. It thus proves unsurprising
that women suered grave side eects when given AZT dosages calibrated to the 70-kg male. Furthermore,
those who t the Center for Disease Control's AIDS prole receive timely Social Security benets, yet the
CDC's denition of AIDS relies on symptoms present in men. Women suering from HIV experience a vari-
ety of recurring gynecological disorders, including cervical cancer, pelvic inammatory disease, and chronic
yeast infections, yet the CDC denition does not reect these symptoms.95Thus, many women with severe
93See R. Alto Charo, Protecting Us to Death: Women, Pregnancy, and Clinical Research Trials, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 135,
142 (1993).
94See Baird, supra note 78, at 547-48.
95See Gorenberg and White, supra note 80, at 221.
37HIV-related disabilities do not qualify for needed benets; roughly 65% of females dying from HIV-related
illness do not meet the CDC denition.96Women diagnosed with AIDS search in vain for treatments designed
specically to mitigate the disease's eects on the female body, causing females to be the fastest growing
group of those dying from the illness. In light of the rapidity with which women aged twenty-ve to forty-
four- i.e. of childbearing age- are acquiring AIDS, it proves crucial that women not be denied the benets
of research.97Not only does exclusion deprive individual infected women of their sole chance to prolong life,
but it also endangers the welfare of potential ospring.
Rectication of women's traditional exclusion from AIDS research as well other clinical trials additionally
demands that special attention in the informed consent process be given to issues particular to women. If the
basal goal of consent is to enhance self-determination of research subjects, disclosure of information as well as
assessment of voluntariness cannot involve one monolithic standard. For women, experimenters must adopt
a standard that accounts for stereotypes of women as incapable, less able, or untrustworthy decision-makers
and that resists gender norms fostering female subordination. Women often defer to physician authority and
do not wish to appear impolite. Older women are especially accustomed to paternalistic relationships with
their physicians, while socioeconomically disadvantaged women as well as those of color may not view them-
selves as autonomous agents, thus reluctant to ask questions, voice concerns, or assert themselves.98Women
of color are often viewed as poor decision-makers and thinkers: a physician asked about his failure to secure
consent from Mexican-American women participants in a contraceptive study involving the possibility of
receiving placebos replied, If you think you can explain a placebo test to women like these, you never met
Mrs. Gomez from the West Side.99More generally, a Commonwealth Fund survey indicates that one in four
96See id.
97See Mastroianni, supra note 84, at 170.
98See Lisa A. Eckenwiler, Pursuing Reform in Clinical Research: Lessons from Women's Experience, 27 J. L. MED. &
ETHIICS 158, 164 (1999).
99Id. at 160.
38women report being talked down to or treated like a child by a physician, as compared with only 12% of
men. Likewise, 17% of women have been told a medical condition was psychosomatic, whereas only 7% of
men have been oered the same diagnosis.100A researcher seeking women's consent must recognize that they
may fear coercion or ridicule and nd participation problematic due to family responsibilities. Such matters
must be addressed by NIH and FDA policies if medical research truly is to embrace women.
Recent NIH reforms resulting from the 1993 Revitalization Act have greatly ameliorated research policies per-
taining to women. All applications for both intramural and extramural research must now include women as
subjects. The Act additionally mandates that valid analysis be performed to demonstrate whether variables
under scrutiny impact subpopulations and the sexes in varying ways. NIH guidelines state that:
[I]t is imperative to determine whether the intervention or therapy
being studied aects women or men...dierently. [These guide-
lines seek] to ensure that all future NIH-supported...research...
will be carried out in a manner sucient to elicit information
about individuals of both genders and...to examine dierential ef-
fects on such groups.101
The chief requirements for valid analysis are that allocation of women and men to the intervention as well as
control groups occurs by a neutral process such as randomization, that researchers perform impartial eval-
uations of the results of studies, and that unbiased statistical methods be employed to gauge and compare
intervention eects among the genders. NIH guidelines additionally delineate when women may and may not
be prohibited from participating: cost is not an acceptable justication, and exclusion cannot be substanti-
ated unless a clear and compelling rationale and justication establishes to the satisfaction of the relevant
100See THE COMMONWEALTH FUND SURVEY OF WOMEN'S HEALTH (The Commonwealth Fund, New York 1993)
pagination not available, quoted in Baird, supra note 78, at 552.
101U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, NAT'L INST. HEALTH, 1994a Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women
and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research, FED. REG. 59(59):14508, quoted in Baird, supra note 78, at 549.
39institute...that the inclusion is inappropriate with respect to the health of the subjects or the purpose of
the research.102A trial may include only one sex if the disease or disorder being studied is gender-specic; in
all other instances, experimenters are to use roughly equal numbers of men and women. Such an approach
promotes gender justice, striving to furnish women with benecial medical knowledge and aiding them in
enjoying healthier lives. The 1993 reforms likewise demand that a data system for collection, retrieval, and
dissipation of knowledge on women's health research which NIH supports be established.
NIH publication of an Outreach Notebook to aid scientists in complying eectively with new guidelines
also deserves commendation, for it oers tips on how to include women as well as on recruitment tactics.
Guidelines recommend
establish[ing] a relationship...[which] represent[s] a
thoughtful
and culturally sensitive plan of outreach and generally include[s] involvement of
other individuals and organizations relevant
to the populations and communities of interest...The objective is
to establish appropriate lines of communication and cooperation to build mutual
trust and cooperation such that both the study and the participants benet from
such collaboration.103
The Notebook warns researchers that issues of coercion prove especially important in dealing with female
subjects. Attention to cultural concerns as well as to the importance of establishing mutual trust addi-
tionally evince respect for women and will work to mitigate many of their reservations concerning protocol
participation. NIH recommendations likewise stress that researchers should exert special eort to ensure
that women are fully informed and issue free consent. They also alert researchers to constraints such as child
care, which may aect the ease with which women of diering ages and socioeconomic statuses can partic-
ipate. Such concerns explicitly acknowledge and legitimize women's experiences,104previously unrecognized
102Id., quoted in Baird, supra note 78, at 550.
104See Baird, supra note 78, at 553.
40or used to justify female exclusion. NIH regulations have been written into law, and the Departments will
no longer fund any projects failing to comply with new policies on the inclusion of women. Researchers,
furthermore, must report yearly on gender of enrolled study subjects. While such advances bode well for the
future, a recent New York Times article discouragingly reports that medical researchers who secure federal
dollars now generally include women as subjects yet disregard the requirement to analyze the eects of novel
drugs on them.105 While NIH has moved from encouragement to requirement with respect to female clinical
trial participation, FDA has merely moved from banishment to encouragement. 1977 guidelines provided
that pregnant women or those at risk for becoming pregnant should be excluded from Phase I studies and
further exhorted that those of childbearing potential be banned from large-scale clinical trials until FDA
animal reproduction tests were performed. Only if sucient information on the eectiveness and safety were
amassed during Phase II could women of childbearing potential, dened to include those using contracep-
tion, lesbians, celibate individuals, and wives whose partners had been vasectomized, be included in further
protocols. FDA too issued new guidelines in 1993, stating that subjects in a clinical trial should reect the
population that will use the drug once marketed and suggesting that subjects include men as well as women
to allow for comparative analysis.
The new guidelines, however, do not require that women be included in early drug trial phases. They de-
mand that scientists secure informed consent from women, warn participants to take necessary measures to
prevent fetal exposure to potentially hazardous drugs, and furnish information about risks of fetal toxicity.
Nevertheless, guidelines still maintain that large-scale exposure of women of childbearing potential should
not occur until results of animal toxicity tests are scrutinized.106FDA regulations additionally contain provi-
sions hindering the ability to render changes in drug research procedures: these hortatory guidelines, which
105See Pear, supra note 79.
106See Baird, supra note 78, at 540.
41state that the Administration sees no need to mandate that women be included in specic trials, do not
necessarily aect drug approval. Mention of the need for more extensive research in drugs and devices that
might particularly benet women is absent, as are details as to what comprises sucient representation of
women in protocols. FDA oers no counterpart to NIH's recognition of women's health experiences, ignores
problems of drawing women to research participation, and fails to extend outreach programs to aid scientists
in including females.107The Administration does, however, alter its former policy of eliminating women of
childbearing potential from studies, reasoning that determinations of fetal risk are properly left to patients,
physicians, local IRBs, and sponsors... 108This appreciation of women's competence to issue informed con-
sent is a noteworthy improvement, though undue emphasis is still placed upon the fetus.
Children
FDA policies have not safeguarded children adequately; while no drug can be approved prior to extensive
tests in adults, drugs administered to children are approved regularly without pediatric testing. Over two-
thirds of drugs sanctioned for use in the United States have not been tested in children,109despite the fact
that many of these substances are regularly prescribed to them. Studies indeed indicate that merely 42%
of drugs frequently used to treat children have been tested on pediatric subjects in clinical trials.110FDA
perpetuates this situation with its Pediatric Use regulation, permitting manufacturers to escape pediatric
testing in cases where the drug will not be marketed specically for children if they ax a warning on
the drug's label stating that [s]afety and eectiveness in pediatric patients have not been established.111As
107See id. at 554.
108U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 1993. Guideline for the Study and
Evaluation of Gender Dierences in the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs. FED. REG. 58 (139): 39408, quoted in Baird, supra
note 78, at 556.
109See Althea Gregory, Denying Protection to Those Most in Need: The FDA's Unconstitutional Treatment of Children, 8
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 121, 122 (1997).
110See Barbara A. Noah, Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 135, 152 n. 63 (1998).
11121 C.F.R. x201.57(f)(9)(vi)(1997).
42FDA regulates drug manufacturers rather than physicians, doctors are free to prescribe drugs to youngsters
despite the fact that they have not been tested in children. Likewise, no requirement exists that a physician
secure informed consent for o-label use of drugs, meaning that children are left to the whims of physicians'
discretion to advise them or their parents that they are receiving substances whose pediatric ecacy remains
uncertain.
Dearth of testing in children proves signicant since youngsters, whose physiology diers immensely from
their seniors, do not absorb drugs in a manner identical to adults. Doctors may thus prescribe drugs in
inappropriate dosages or may opt not to prescribe potentially benecial yet untested drugs at all. While
FDA may argue that pediatric testing will nevertheless occur as a result of market forces, minute market
size and lack of protability of adding a pediatric use to a drug label do not motivate drug manufacturers to
alter current practices.112It should be noted, however, that FDA recently proposed to require manufacturers
to collect and record pediatric data.
The proposal, though, prompts consideration of unique diculties of informed consent which arise with
children. Surrogate consent is necessary for protocols involving children. That of both parents is required
where research implicates a greater than minimal risk with no chance of direct benet to the individual
child but proves likely to produce general knowledge of the subject's illness. Both parents must also consent
if experimentation is not otherwise authorizable yet presents an opportunity to understand or mitigate a
grave health problem aecting children. Youngsters themselves generally must assent to participation, yet
regulations appear to bestow unrestrained authority to consent to their child's participation in research upon
parents of small children unable to assent.113Parents, however, may be unable to isolate and safeguard an
individual child's safety and dignity. In the Baby Fae case, for example, a dying child received an experimen-
112See Gregory, supra note 109, at 146-47.
113See Holmes-Farley and Grodin, supra note 11, at 161.
43tal baboon heart transplant. While the patient's mother consented, the procedure stands as a disheartening
instance of a mother swayed by her child's forlorn situation. Even if consent was voluntarily and consciously
given, it should never have been requested.114Surrogate consent proves nettlesome because one can never
ascertain with certainty if the parent's decision is proper, i.e. loyal to the child's best interests and desires, if
known. Those lacking capability to consent should not be coerced into altruism by way of their surrogates'
choices, and proxy consent, which fosters an image of a powerless research subject, amounts to little more
than a contradiction if consent seeks to exalt self-autonomy and self-determination. Willingness to accept
proxy consent reects our dilemma between devotion to individual dignity and utilitarianism: when forced
to compromise the former to permit needed experimental procedures and trials, we hide the tradeo and
profess enduring respect for the value which was subordinated.115 Prisoners
Concerns for human dignity and capacity to consent underlie the severe regulatory restrictions on conducting
research on prisoners, ideal subjects not only for cost control reasons but also since life is subject to few vari-
ations...[and] [t]he imposition of experimental procedures that might inconvenience free...subjects is not a
burden on [them].116Prisoners comprise a vulnerable population as a physically healthy, captive group ideal
for studies necessitating constant monitoring of subjects as well as rigorous control over diet and activity. As
demonstrated by the oft-cited prison research case of Kaimowitz v. MI Dept. of Mental Health,117prisoners
may grapple with constraints due to their incarceration which impact their capacity to render truly unco-
erced and free consent. The Michigan Circuit Court confronted a situation in which the patient had signed a
consent form permitting experimental psychosurgery, and two committees had reviewed the consent process
114See Garnett, supra note 6, at 486.
115See id. at 487.
116GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT'S
DILEMMA (1977) at 103, quoted in id. at 478.
117Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County, July 10, 1973).
44as well as the study. Holding that the procedure could not be performed even with the prisoner's consent, the
Court judged the consent suspect partially due to the inherently coercive atmosphere of the institution.118It
additionally commented on the precariousness of psychosurgery, adamant that psychosurgery should never
be undertaken upon involuntarily committed populations, when there is a high-risk low-benets ratio and
raised concerns about bargaining power imbalances in the prison scenario.119Situational coercion proves
problematic since it constrains the prisoner's freedom to render choices.
Compounding such diculties is the message of the penal system- one which may be oered to exonerate
experimentation- that prisoners necessitate reform and reshaping.120If prisoners regard themselves as re-
quiring alteration, they may judge a hazardous reformatory experimental procedure in their best interests.
One commentator notes, however, that the applicability of ethical principles should not depend on the par-
ticipants' willingness...to take particular risks any more than a person's agreement to be a slave justies
slavery.121Although regulations require that incarcerated persons be clearly informed that participation will
not impact parole opportunities, concerns nevertheless remain that prisoner motivation to consent may em-
anate from the hope of appearing more favorably before a parole board.
Prisoners are additionally protected in the regulations through explicitly prohibited inducements. Their
participation may not be secured through advantages in living conditions or chances to accumulate earnings
to a degree that would interfere with their ability to weigh the risks of research against the value of such
advantages in the limited choice environment of the prison.122Holmesburg Prison studies which University of
118Id., pagination not available, quoted in King and Henderson, supra note 4, at 1042.
119Id., quoted in Garnett, supra note 6, at 482.
120See Garnett, supra note 6, at 481.
121Wendy K. Mariner, AIDS Research and the Nuremberg Code, in NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 286-304 (George J. Annas and Michael A. Grodin, eds., 1992) at 295,
quoted in id. at 493.
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45Pennsylvania scientist Albert Kligman performed demonstrate problems of inducement confronting prison-
ers. Tests involving prisoners helped formulate Retin-A skin cream, yet former inmates complain that they
were not informed of possible long-term eects of the trials and were exploited and lured into participation
through pecuniary means. One explains:
People coming from a street background making 75 cents an hour
(on) a day job, going to jail and being able to make $15 on a
study [will participate]{that would give you commissary for
three weeks.123 Guidelines for research involving prisoners do not merit criticism, however, because they
place signicant restrictions on the use of a vulnerable population in research yet aord the group the
right to participate. For research implicating incarcerated individuals, IRBs may approve protocols only if
researchers oer no questionable incentives to participate, dangers of participation would be acceptable to a
free volunteer, pertinent information is furnished in understandable language, subjects are selected equitably,
and prisoner participation does not bear upon parole decisions.124A majority of IRB members must also lack
ties to the prison from which human subjects are drawn, and at least one member must include a prisoner
or prisoner representative with applicable background knowledge and experience.125While regulations do
not fully eradicate coercive forces present in prisoner decisionmaking, they greatly abate them without
forcing IRBs to forbid prisoner enrollment in research studies. Foregoing such blanket exclusion proves
extremely signicant as the prison population includes large numbers of AIDS suerers. Depriving them of
the opportunity to participate in HIV-related protocols would deny them any chance to receive treatment,
demonstrating that the sole equitable approach with respect to experimentation in vulnerable populations
123Ex-Inmates Seek Treatment for Prison Experiments, (November 8, 1998) <http://www.cnn.com/US/9811/08/acres.of.skin>.
124See 45 C.F.R. x46.305(a).
125See 45 C.F.R. x46.304.
46may be to permit participation.
The Cognitively Impaired
Protecting the decisionally impaired presents a persistent denitional dilemma. Every individual may be la-
beled decisionally impaired at some moment due to causes such as disease, immaturity, traumatic life events,
or side eects of medication. The term mentally disabled remains undened in federal regulations, and it
seemingly includes a vast array of conditions. For decisionally impaired persons, reduced decision-making
abilities resulting from illness involving cognitive impairment and/or the captivity of institutionalization
may create vulnerability. Similar concerns exist in elderly patients suering from dementia, depression, and
other psychoses frequently seen in life's advanced stages. Research on those manifesting such problems poses
ethical complications, for psychiatric illness as well as dementing disorders impact or eradicate a subject's
capacity to furnish valid informed consent. The precise relationship between possessing sound mind and
ability to issue voluntary, informed consent plagues psychiatrists, judges, and attorneys,126as does the con-
comitant problem of safeguarding these vulnerable individuals while improving and making treatments for
ravaging illnesses available.
Federal regulations, however, furnish no guidance on identifying or evaluating decisional capacity for pur-
poses of participation in experimental protocols. Determination that a potential subject proves unable to
consent to participation means that such consent must come from a surrogate or proxy, yet regulations oer
scant guidance on this issue. Due to the absence of regulatory guidance as well as governmental resolve
to address ethical issues pertaining to cognitively impaired research subjects, numerous organizations have
promulgated and adopted research guidelines in the area. These guidelines put forth several sliding scales
of permissibility and safeguards premised on categorization of protocols in terms of degree of risk as well
126See Ruth Macklin, Some Problems in Gaining Informed Consent from Psychiatric Patients, 31 EMORY L.J. 345, 348
(1982).
47as potential for direct, tangible benet to the individual subject.127Lack of specic federal direction on
research with decisionally impaired individuals has additionally meant that non-federally funded protocols
have evolved in fty dierent directions: state regulation in this area can be described only as a crazy
quilt...with most [states] having no rules that clearly apply to this group while some are quite restrictive.128
The decision in T.D. v. N.Y.S. Oce of Mental Health,129for example, bans all state-sponsored research in-
volving mental patients implicating greater than minimal risk and denying subjects potential benets. This
result foreclosed signicant research on mental illness, namely department of psychiatry studies at Cornell,
an institution possessing a vast portfolio of foundation-funded experiments. Clinical studies with decision-
ally impaired individuals must continue; performing it without undercutting the very humanity it aspires
to promote will always demand a delicate balance.130If excessive protections are imposed on research par-
ticipation of the cognitively impaired individual, they will disproportionately single him out and aggravate
already existing stigmas. They will additionally deny the cognitively impaired individuals the equity and
fairness aorded to other groups. Among subclasses of potential participants often regarded as vulnerable
and necessitating stringent protection, the decisionally impaired are unique in that no federal regulations
addressing them exist. Guidelines, however, are badly needed so researchers can more easily balance goals
of advancing knowledge with safeguarding the welfare of human subjects.
The complications psychiatric patients present in securing informed consent further evince the need for such
regulations. Federal guidelines mandate disclosure of any appropriate alternative courses of treatment which
might benet the subject, presenting fundamental hardships. Not only do a greater number of therapies with
127See Marshall B. Kapp, Decisional Capacity, Older Human Research Subjects, and IRBs: Beyond Forms and Guidelines,
9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 359, 361 (1998).
128Moreno, supra note 14, at 14.
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by 684 N.E. 2d 281 (N.Y. 1997), and appeal dismissed by 1997 WL 785461 (N.Y. Dec.. 22, 1997).
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48lesser degrees of certainty about eectiveness exist in psychiatry than in somatic medicine, but psychiatrists
also often display adamant commitment to a particular mode of therapy.131These doctors thus may hesitate
to outline alternative therapy possibilities to patients. Additionally, the therapy-patient relationship often
is more germane to the progress and outcome of psychiatric treatment than is the physician-patient rela-
tionship to healing.132The trust and condence a psychiatric patient places in his doctor proves a crucial
component of the therapeutic relationship, especially where the patient's capacity to verbalize his thoughts
is a signicant part of the treatment. It is thus plausible for psychiatrists to reason that discussion of alter-
native modes of therapy might dilute the esteem a patient holds in his therapist, thereby interfering with the
therapeutic process.133 An additional obstacle to securing truly informed consent from psychiatric patients
is the subject's ability to grant it. Questions of competence need not be raised for the large numbers of
patients seeking psychotherapy for issues such as marital discontent, and incompetence may be recognized
easily in cases involving patients unable to communicate, but most psychiatric cases lie in between these two
extremes. As with prisoners, concern about voluntariness of consent arises with institutionalized patients.
Various inherent characteristics of psychiatric patients, such as dependency, complicate the question of free
consent to a proposed therapy or protocol. This complication is exacerbated by the fact that psychiatrists
often possess the capacity to sway patients to consent to nearly anything.
Dealing with subjects whose decision-making capacities may be impaired is also a concern for investigators
recruiting geriatric subjects, for this involves conducting research on individuals suering from depression,
dementia, or other late life psychoses. Safeguarding the elderly who are cognitively challenged and conned
to hospitals or nursing homes is only one regulation mandating that a scientist procure legally eective in-
131See Macklin, supra note 126, at 351-52.
132See id. at 352.
133See id.
49formed consent of...the subject's legally authorized representative.134Eective trials and experiments must
have older participants currently aicted with a medical condition under scrutiny, yet as with other vul-
nerable populations, these subjects lack sucient capacity to grant ethically valid consent to participate.
Standards and procedures for capacity evaluation should reect an appreciation that potential subjects need
individual evaluation.135Requiring IRBs to involve independent third parties to succor and supervise consent
negotiations involving the cognitively impaired elderly would improve the current situation.
While greater uniformity and specicity is needed in regulations pertaining to research involving all cog-
nitively impaired classes, focus upon the knowledge and standardized tools requisite to measure ability to
furnish consent to research participation also proves necessary. Evaluation to Sign Consent (ESC) is one
test that has been developed to determine capacity to consent in clinical settings. A ve-item questionnaire
scrutinizing a subject's factual understanding of information pertinent to participation in a specic study,
ESC could be employed to ascertain which patients possess sucient capacity to grant ethically and legally
valid consent. In the test's rst systematic application to a randomized, clinical drug trial, sixteen of twenty-
four subjects failed the assessment.136In contrast to ESC, which is a short and concrete aid inquiring only
about study-specic facts, another standardized measure known as the MacArthur Competence Assessment
Tool-Clinical Research (MacCAT-CR) involves a twenty-page questionnaire posing questions related to a
hypothetical study. This long and abstract measure examines the eectiveness of the standardized assess-
ment tool utilized to evaluate capacity to grant consent. While it may set an unreasonably high standard
for psychiatric subject participation, the ESC test may not be suciently exacting.137These are the only
13445 C.F.R. x46.116 (1992).
135See Kapp, supra note 127, at 362.
136See DeRenzo et al., supra note 37, at 83 (1998).
137See id. at 85.
50two existing assessments of capacity-to-give-consent research tools in the testing phase,138yet both possess
shortcomings. Further research pertaining to methods of assessing capacity to consent is thus in order.
Consent Complications in Modern Science: The Problem of Gene Therapy
Newer, more severe challenges to informed consent and vulnerability of subjects come with gene therapy.
Genetic research proves likely to have an incredibly profound inuence upon the twenty-rst century, and the
Human Genome Project already has impacted the direction of future research. The Project, which has seen
recent successes in identifying and sequencing all sets of genes that comprise the human being, is expected
to enable the curing of disease through information contained in genomic mapping. Investigators' hope that
the Project will spur a therapeutic revolution has resulted in extensive promotion of human gene transfer
research as therapy. The thorny ethical and legal dilemmas this practice raises, however, escalate with each
new discovery.
Perhaps no event in recent human history has done more to highlight the results of decient oversight than
Jesse Gelsinger's demise. Pressured by Congress to explain aws in gene therapy oversight, federal health
ocials conceded that they could not determine whether experiments had hastened or possibly caused the
deaths of other subjects.139Subsequent to an NIH reminder, issued in the wake of the Gelsinger tragedy,
to report all adverse occurrences related to gene therapy trials, 652 new problems surfaced, ranging from
fevers to partial paralysis and death.140While admitting that it failed to report immediately three deaths
to a governmental research agency, Boston's Beth Israel Medical Center stressed that it did inform FDA
yet received no reply. Researchers at Boston's St. Elizabeth's Medical Center likewise failed to report the
138See id. at 84.
139See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senators Press for Answers on Gene Trials, N.Y. TIMES, February 3, 2000, at A25 (col. 1).
140See Rachel K. Sobel, Add Insult to Injury: Gene Therapy's Travails, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., February 21, 2000, at
55.
51death of a patient involved in a gene therapy experiment that may have contributed to the development
of cancer in another patient. That latter subject's condition was also improperly reported. As discussion
arose as to why investigators habitually out federal guidelines to report experimental side eects in patients
to NIH, one explanation surfaced: the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, its panel supervising gene
therapy, lost authority to approve research protocols in 1996. As a result, scientists ceased to take the body
seriously. Researchers additionally claim confusion surrounds which governmental agency should receive
adverse reports, with NIH blaming FDA and FDA blaming NIH.
Recognizing that improvements in reporting are requisite if the public is not to remain skeptical, FDA
and NIH announced an initiative in March, 2000 with potential to impact review of gene transfer trials
profoundly. FDA will demand that sponsors of gene transfer trials regularly submit monitoring plans to it,
and the Administration will review the plans, demand alterations where necessary, and supervise as well as
inspect trials to certify proper monitoring. While these policies represent a signicant response to misgivings
over gene therapy trial oversight, they fail to address a large majority of clinical trials. Many trials occur
outside the gene therapy context, and patients in them face tremendous risk.141Innovative research in genetics
additionally illustrates that traditional solutions to consent have grown obsolete. With DNA banking, for
example, disclosure of information involving the manner of safeguarding privacy, duration of time for which
tissues will be stored, and whether biological material will be used for secondary research all need to be
addressed if a subject's assent to participation is to be truly informed and voluntary.
Gene therapy also raises a diculty present in clinical trials involving terminally ill subjects, namely the
conation of the research/ therapy distinction. NIH director Harold Varmus explains one factor contributing
to the obfuscation:
141See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH
SUBJECTS: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS, OEI-01-97-00197 (April 2000) <http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/a447.pdf>.
52Expectations of current gene therapy have been oversold. Over-
zealous representation of clinical gene therapy has obscured the
exploratory nature of the initial studies, colored the manner in
which ndings are portrayed...and led to the widely held, but
mistaken, perception that clinical gene therapy is already highly
successful.142 A March, 1996 report of the General Accounting Oce additionally concedes that the line dif-
ferentiating research from treatment is frequently nebulous to clinicians.143Conducting gene transfer studies
in the context of patient care thus creates considerable confusion, with the blurring of research and therapy
exemplied in the term gene therapy. The term both signies novel insights into the workings of the hu-
man body and connotes routine therapeutic practice.144While the former meaning infuses gene therapy with
appeal, the latter interpretation permits experimental interventions to be prematurely applied clinically as
merely another therapeutic modality.145 Another challenge to informed consent and human subject protec-
tion in the context of gene therapy involves physicians' nancial incentives to perform experimental studies,
which create conicts of interest. Investigators have become increasingly involved in post-marketing research,
prompting concerns that patient may receive scanty disclosure and that doctors possess sucient motivation
to sacrice the interests of patient-subjects to their own scal ends. Concerns that biotechnology funds alter
informed consent prove substantial: at University of Pennsylvania, the doctor directing the school's Institute
for Human Gene Therapy at the time of the Gelsinger incident also founded a biotechnology rm in which
he holds stock. This company provided him with the monetary backing for the Institute. Many researchers
in the gene therapy have signicant nancial stakes in the eld; the doctor overseeing the aforementioned
142S.H. Orkin and A.G. Motulsky, NIH AD HOC COMM. REP., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANEL
TO ASSESS THE NIH INVESTMENT IN RESEARCH ON GENE THERAPY, October 7, 1995, quoted in Churchill et al.,
supra note 19, at 38.
143See GEN. ACCT. OFF., SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: CONTINUED VIGILANCE CRITICAL TO PROTECTING HUMAN
SUBJECTS, March 8, 1996, at 23.
144See Churchill et al., supra note 19, at 43.
145See id.
53St. Elizabeth trials likewise is a founder of a company leading the trials and a major stockholder in it. Such
involvement leads to doubts that clinical researchers enjoying equity in companies and who stand to gain
from genetic experimentation can be trusted to report serious adverse eects occurring during such studies
and to safeguard patient welfare. Harvard Medical School harbors this concern, prohibiting scientists with
nontrivial nancial interests in companies to participate in clinical trials of their products.146The St. Eliza-
beth's case demonstrates what may occur when such policies are absent: necessary tests were not performed
in certain cases, several patients enrolled might not have been eligible for the study, and one included patient
unquestionably should have been excluded under the experiment's rules.
Such agrant errors result from rigorous competition for patients. Pharmaceutical companies typically
need roughly 4000 subjects to test an experimental drug and pay physicians up to $2500 per patient re-
cruited.147Marketplace ideology now pervades medicine, placing considerable emphasis on prot. This men-
tality subordinates both scientic truth and patent welfare. One observer of new biotechnology laments that
[t]o do science, you need money, but to raise money competitively you need to project illusions that are the
antithesis of science.148 Academic research itself is highly competitive, with researchers vying for lab space,
grants, and top graduate students. Rewards for innovative research come in the forms of tenure, promotion,
and opportunities at eminent universities and research sites. These considerations combine with nancial
incentives to foster a permissive attitude toward use of human subjects in which informed consent as well as
patient autonomy is undervalued and the niceties of disclosure and consent are overlooked.149Scientists seek
breakthroughs since continued nancial support directly depends on demonstrated progress. This creates in-
146See Richard A. Knox, Physicians Deny Deaths Unreported: Researchers Dispute NIH Ocials' Claim, BOSTON GLOBE,
November 4, 1999, at C1.
147See Clinical Trials Database Goes Online, N.Y. TIMES, February 28, 2000, at A14 (col.4).
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54centives to inate claims regarding the therapeutic hope new interventions may oer. Despite the signicant
nancial and reputational motivations of investigators, IRBs as well as individual subjects regularly possess
no knowledge of the ways in which these factors inuence the applicable researcher. While nancing has been
the most tangible, signicant change in clinical trials over past decades, it remains unaddressed in federal
regulations. Regulatory reform is needed to prevent monetary considerations from demoting autonomy and
subject safety as well as from bolstering therapeutic misconceptions.
Proposals for Future Improvement in Informed Consent and IRBs
Problems of informed consent in gene therapy and in research generally evince that more care must be taken
in divorcing clinical trials from therapy and that more meaningful conversations between investigators and
potential subjects must take place. Physician-researchers must regard themselves as scientists only, not as
doctors, for they become double agents with conicting loyalties by conating research with therapy and
subjects with patients.150Legally sucient consent may not be morally valid, however, because morally valid
consent seeks true con-sent, an agreeing together.151A rigorous, clear policy mandating full disclosure could
promote autonomy by creating an awareness in patients not to trust physicians to restore health, but rather to
rely on an experimental protocol to produce valuable knowledge and perhaps ameliorate their condition. To
secure truly valid consent, researchers should be required to explain: (1) that subjects are not only patients,
and to the extent to which they are patients, their therapeutic needs will be subordinated to scientic
concerns; (2) that a research protocol and question guide the experimental study, and individual interests
will be subordinated to scientic concerns; (3) that clinical research seeks to furnish doctors with information
on which treatments are most hazardous, benecial, or ineective; (4) that clinical research may be in the
subject's immediate best interest, future interest, or may oer no benet at all, especially if the patient
150See Katz, supra note 33, at 28.
151See id. at 34.
55receives a placebo; (5) that it is uncertain if the patient's welfare would be promoted through treatment by
a physician rather than a doctor-investigator; and (6) that the researcher will respect whatever decision the
subject ultimately makes.152Additionally, informed consent should be deemed an ongoing process in which
preliminary data the study yields is furnished to subjects, who are assured of continual receipt of information
when they initially consent to participate. Conversing forthrightly with patients will aord them a more
profound understanding of the dierence between clinical research and therapy.
Informed consent is fundamentally about language and communication between subjects and researchers
as well as physicians and patients, yet the process currently does not promote candor. Attention thus
should be given to meaningful communication rather than to supplying mere facts. Doctors enjoy the
best position to foster discussions since subjects and patients may not possess enough information even
to formulate questions or voice reservations. The medical profession must come to recognize that patients
desire substantial disclosure on dangers and alternatives to a particular procedure or study both to decide
upon a the most appropriate course of treatment and to know what to expect. On the other hand, subjects
should no longer be barraged with esoteric medical information that elucidates little and obfuscates basic,
crucial facts needed to issue informed and voluntary consent. Researchers thus bear an obligation to translate
scientic jargon into language comprehensible and pertinent to subjects and to purge informed consent forms
of distracting, inconsequential technical information.153Consent forms thus require meaningful alteration,
for they currently provide a better understanding of an investigator's aims to IRBs rather than to potential
subjects. Gene transfer research consent forms, for example, should plainly indicate that no expected benet
to the individual subject exists. As George Annas observes,
[W]e must use language to clarify rather than obscure what we
152See id.
153See id. at 36.
56do to one another. Minimally, we must correctly identify and
describe roles and responsibilities in human experimentation...
I
t may not be realistic to think we can always distinguish re-
search from therapy, physicians from scientists, or subjects from
patients. Nonetheless, it's morally imperative to use language to
clarify....because ignoring these dierences undermines the
integrity of scientic research, the integrity of the medical profes-
sion, and the rights and welfare of subjects and patients.154 Candor additionally suggests that federal
regulations must require researchers to reveal any and all scal incentives involved in experimentation to
potential subjects as well as to IRBs. Guidelines might also be amended to condition federal funding on the
premise that no institutional employee may enjoy a personal nancial incentive in research. Additionally,
they might require that any prots from research be deposited in university research accounts and utilized
for the good of persons similar to the subject or to promote study into the condition examined in the
protocol.155Such mandates would extend academic conict rules existing at many state and local institutions
to research settings nationally, promoting greater uniformity.
Informed consent could further uplift autonomy through adoption of a life plan approach.156Researchers
would be required to determine a subject's life plan, i.e. mindset, to determine what information is relevant
to consent. This approach necessitates moving beyond boilerplate descriptions of risks and benets, reecting
a recognition that not all subjects share identical hesitations, hopes, vulnerabilities, and levels of risk aversion.
Researchers would thus have to delve into areas such as a patient's education, current circumstances, life
history, and family backgrounds and devote special attention in detailing a study to aspects this particular
subject would care to know. In some circumstances, arrangements must be made for consent to be secured by
154Annas, supra note 70, at 322.
155See Delgado and Leskovac, supra note 29, at 126.
156See id. at 114.
57the same process through an intermediary not directly linked to the protocol. Such a provision would mitigate
possibility for conicts of interest and enhance probabilities that subject preferences receive considerable
weight. Medical social workers might serve as intermediaries and could work with investigators to ascertain
the nature of the research before translating this information into terms comprehensible to the subject. The
intermediary or investigator must additionally take care to conduct conversations and secure consent in an
uncoercive environment; a pleasant and familiar setting eases a subject's ability to act freely. The life plan
approach thus would respect free choice by discouraging disclosure shaped by paternalism as well as by
heeding a patient's value judgments, however much a physician disagrees with them.
For trials posing greater than minimal risks to subjects, mandating use of a subject advocate or surrogate
system involving use of individuals attuned to the needs and concerns of a subject would also improve
informed consent.157Jesse Gelsinger's father, a handyman, indeed stated that [he] would have liked to have
had somebody there who was not aliated with Penn that could have assisted in describing the whole process
of gene therapy.158An advocate trained to recognize the psychological complications that accompany terminal
diagnoses likewise can aid patients in confronting depression and in digesting the information they receive.
Surrogates additionally are able voice concerns that subjects are unable or reluctant to ask. Researchers
with monetary incentives may prove more likely to oer full disclosure when they recognize that the consent
process is being meticulously scrutinized on a subject's behalf. Until such a requirement is in place, however,
a subject should be advised to have friends or relatives accompany him to meetings where physicians detail
risks and alternatives of clinical trial participation. As FDA Commissioner Henney explains, [i]f they don't
understand something, it might be that [the subject] didn't either, for patients are very vulnerable for
157To ensure free choice as well as the viability of this suggestion, subjects must be able to decline to use a subject advocate,
and advocates should be employed only to the extent necessary to guarantee adequacy of informed consent. See Addicott,
supra note 64, at 519-20.
158Stolberg, supra note 1.
58information that might sound too hopeful.159 Another serious failing of the law of informed consent is the
refusal to recognize that insucient disclosure of information to patient-subjects is a wrong worthy of legal
protection. Federal regulations do not adequately stress the sanctity of human rights, and courts have failed
to label a researcher's shortcomings in securing informed consent an intrusion into the subject's right of self-
determination meriting remedy. To safeguard the dignity and autonomy of patients, a cause of action for
nondisclosure, based upon duciary and negligence law, should be developed. Fiduciary principles demand
the most exacting levels of disclosure and performance from a duciary, and the law demands that such an
individual who acts in his own interest compensate the dependent party. Courts may assess damages upon
the deviating duciary or award prots the duciary earns to the dependent party. Under this approach, a
duciary relationship would arise from the ties between investigator and subject, the former charged with
securing informed consent in a manner that accommodates the latter's individual values and desires.160Upon
nding a breach of duciary duty, a court could, inter alia, apply general damages for the breach and for
emotional harm, impose punitive damages upon a scientist for wanton, willful, or reckless disregard of a
subject's autonomy, demand special damages for proven losses, or apply equitable remedies such as creating
a constructive trust upon pecuniary gain when researchers fail to disclose monetary incentives.161 Another
reform which would benet patients would be to create a national human investigation board. Large-scale
collaborative research protocols have made the monitoring of research trials a daunting task, rendering a
federal agency with rule-making and adjudicatory power over aairs pertaining to human experimentation
desirable. Such a body could fashion research policies, function as a source with which local IRBs could
consult for guidance, and publicize decisions rendered by itself as well as local IRBs. It additionally would
159Clinical Trials Database Goes Online, supra note 147.
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59facilitate possibility for consistency and comprehensiveness of the review process within and between IRBs,
whose decisions are largely matters of judgment inuenced by local considerations.
Boards typically focus on risk-benet ratios and consent forms, which often fail to furnish relevant information
to subjects in any comprehensible way, thus rendering these bodies unlikely to promote meaningful consent.
In addition or as an alternative to a national body, IRBs could be required to monitor especially risky
research, protocols involving vulnerable subjects, situations where an investigator has a signicant conict
of interest, and trials less likely to attract outside or press scrutiny.162While IRBs have functioned primarily as
paperwork gatekeepers to the initiation of human research rather than as watchdogs continuously overseeing
investigators' ongoing actions, the Oce for Protection from Research Risks reports:
It would be a mistake to see the IRB approval process as a one-
step in the life of a research project. IRB approval is a temporary
authority that may be withdrawn at any time if warranted by the
conduct of the research. The regulations authorize the IRB to est-
ablish procedures for the concurrent monitoring of research activ-
ities. The responsibility for continued monitoring of approved
research is as important as the initial review and approval.163 IRBs could additionally promote consent
further by employing waiting periods between an investigator's invitation to a subject to participate and
the signing of the consent form for entry into a study, thus allowing the patient time to comprehend and
consider participation. They might additionally observe or have a third party observe the consent process.
Such reforms could be eected if NIH permits additional grant funds to institutions to furnish necessary
resources for IRBs.
Improved monitoring alone proves insucient, however, for a more fundamental diculty- i.e. confusion
over what precise function an IRB is supposed to perform- exists and can be remedied only by altering
162See Goldner, supra note 16, at 133.
163Kapp, supra note 127, at 364.
60the composition of these bodies. IRBs serve as scientic, technical, institutionally-grounded peer-review
bodies which evaluate risk-benet ratios and ensure that investigators work to minimize hazards. Yet, they
also are intended to serve a representative function as the conscience of the broader local community in
assessing community approval of the risk-benet ratio. These two tasks are irreconcilable given the current
composition of these bodies, for dominance by medical researchers creates fundamental obstacles to boards'
capacities to review critically the content of information furnished as part of the informed consent process.
Highly trained scientists occupy no position to determine what a reasonable patient would care to know.
Federal regulations must be altered to permit greater IRB participation by nonscientists as well as those
lacking links to research institutions. One possibility is a dual committee system, where one completely
professional body would scrutinize only the scientic aspects of a proposed protocol to ensure minimization
of risk and to consider the signicance of information that might be acquired. A second group comprised of
external, community based members would debate community acceptability of the risk-benet calculus.164
Another alternative is to require that at least half of the members of all ethical review bodies be composed of
nonresearchers and nonphysicians, which would highlight the degree to which a scientist's goals digress from
those of ordinary citizens. In Denmark, for example, guidelines traditionally mandated that such committees
have three lay members as well as three medical members, reecting an awareness that lay members can
be overawed when medical personnel dominate a committee.165Evincing the Dane conviction that medical
ethics are of concern to society at large, the country's Parliament passed a bill in 1992 requiring that one lay
member more than the number of professional members always occupy a reviewing body. Observers report
that lay members frequently oer the most valuable contributions and that they seem better positioned to
recognize inappropriate risk-benet sacrices.166Public access may additionally render IRBs more likely to
164See Goldner, supra note 16, at 107-08.
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61perform eectively and will strengthen public condence in the research review process.
Improvement additionally necessitates greater government enforcement of IRBs. NIH's Oce of Protections
from Research Risks (OPRR) and FDA are the two entities within the DHHS responsible for IRB oversight.
OPRR primarily performs this responsibility by demanding renewed assurances from IRBs, i.e. documents
declaring the institution's commitment to respect human subject participation guidelines as well as policies
and procedures for meeting regulations. OPRR additionally conducts a limited number of IRB inspections,
but reviews are largely in response to complaints or concerns about compliance. FDA also inspects clinical
investigators, IRBs, and sponsors. Since June, 1998, the enforcement of federal human subject protection
requirements has escalated, with FDA and OPRR intensifying their on-site presence at research institutions.
The latter's activities have proven particularly eective in demanding the research community's attention to
IRB oversight as well as to human subject protections, and inuential medical journals have devoted atten-
tion to OPRR's enforcement actions.167DHHS agencies, however, seldom move beyond the aforementioned
oversight mechanisms: FDA inspections, for example, remain narrow and focused on compliance. FDA
should adopt a more results-oriented approach to its inspections, devoting greater attention to the manner
in which individuals are invited to participate in research as well as to how and the degree to which IRBs are
rendering ongoing assessments of risk-benet trade-os.168 IRBs alone, however, cannot perfect the research
review process: their current overextension demands reform providing for greater education of investigators
rather than for mere fortication of these bodies as well as the oversight process. Sponsors, researchers, and
their institutions are collectively responsible for creating and sustaining a setting which elevates the rights
and welfare of subjects. This demands a steady educational eort. The IRB system largely relies upon
researchers' dedication to respecting human subject protections, yet it oers little educational outreach or
167See PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 143, at 9.
168See id. at 16.
62continuing guidance to investigators to help them become informed and sensitized about safeguards.169Given
the explosion in IRB numbers as well as the intricacy of issues they now confront, novel educational eorts
are necessary. NIH may promote such eorts by increasing the educational sta and budget of OPRR, part of
whose mission is to clarify ethical issues which human research presents. It may additionally oer competitive
grants to fund studies on innovative educational strategies tailored to IRBs and researchers.170 Promulga-
tion of new international research rules additionally is desirable. The United Nations should formulate a
Covenant on Human Experimentation premised upon the Nuremberg Code, covering all non-therapeutic
research as well as therapeutic research on competent individuals.171Provisions pertaining to children, the
cognitively impaired, and the terminally ill should also be included. An international tribunal on human
experimentation also needs to be established. Without a body possessing authority to judge and chastise
investigators who violate international norms, we cannot alter a status quo where international norms of
human research are subordinated to the domain of ethics and are disregarded in that domain. A tribunal
enables international ethics to bear the force of law.
Improving patients' rights in clinical trials and experiments proves crucial since our quest for the medical
Holy Grail has repeatedly had destructive consequences for individual subjects. As Bertolt Brecht warns in
a play authored shortly after Hiroshima,
...[T]he intent of science is to ease human existence...Should
we
...discover all there is to be discovered, [our] progress
must become a progress away from the bulk of humanity. The
gulf might even grow so wide that the sound of [our] cheering
at some new achievement would be echoed by a universal
169See id. at 23.
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63howl of horror.172 Human trials prove indispensable in the acquisition of knowledge to relieve human suer-
ing, yet investigators' invocations of their moral right to perform experiments on individual human beings
too often ignore how the invitation to participate can be oered so as to respect one's right to personal
autonomy and integrity. Too often we have merely given lip service to subjects' rights to full information,
yet it remains indefensible to manipulate some human beings for the ends of others. Regulations must
be altered and experimental procedures formally reformed to clarify the distinction between research and
therapy as well as the attendant confusion of subjects and patients, to dierentiate between the goals of
medicine and research, to change the impact of the ideology of medical professionalism upon the conduct of
human experimentation, and to delineate clearly the principles governing participation of dierent groups in
research. Law is the appropriate tool to improve human subject protection, for its represents a socializing
force instructive of community moral and social norms. It additionally serves a declaratory role in oering
authoritative statements of morality and exerts a socializing inuence by furnishing a framework for moral
education.173Over time, then, the law can shape the behavior and thinking of scientic investigators. Pro-
mulgation of varying guidelines for dierent research populations promotes formal recognition that a single
monolithic standard governing human subject protection disregards human autonomy and ignores society's
multifarious needs.
Reforms in codes, regulations, and procedures alone, however, will not be sucient to elucidate societal
goals for research as well as the conduct of medicine or to describe the meaning of progress.174Resolution of
these fundamental issues necessitates concession of both society and investigators that immortality is not a
reasonable aim for medicine or mankind as well as recognition that quality of life may be more important to
172BERTOLT BRECHT, GALILEO 18 (Charles Laughton, trans., and Eric Bentley, ed., 1992), quoted in Annas, supra note
70, at 324.
173See Goldner, supra note 16, at 117-18.
174See Annas, supra note 34, at 139.
64some human beings than its quantity. Individual dignity cannot be abandoned in the quest for progress. If
informed consent is to reach its full potential to safeguard the rights of human research subjects, mankind
must consider the following challenge posed by philosopher Hans Jonas:
Let us not forget that progress is an optional goal, not an uncomp-
romising commitment. [A] slower progress in the conquest of
disease would not threaten society, grievous as it is to those who
have to deplore that their particular disease be not yet conquered,
but that society would indeed be threatened by the erosion of those
moral values whose loss possibly caused by too ruthless a pursuit
of scientic progress, would make its most dazzling triumphs not
worth having.175
175Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reections on Experimenting With Human Subjects. 98 DAEDULUS 219, 245 (1969), quoted
in Katz, supra note 33, at 51.
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